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Abst ract  
The various fem inist  j udgm ent  projects (FJPs)  have explored through the im agined 
rewrit ing of j udgm ents a range of ways in which a fem inist  perspect ive m ay be 
applied to the pract ice of j udging. But  how do these im agined judgm ents com pare to 
what  actual fem inist  j udges do? This art icle presents the results of the author ’s 
em pirical research to date on ‘real world’ fem inist  judging. Drawing on case study 
and interview data it  explores the how ,  when and where of fem inist  j udging, that  is, 
the fem inist  resources, tools and techniques judges have drawn upon, the stages in 
the hearing and decision-m aking process at  which these resources, t ools and 
techniques have been deployed, and the areas of law in which they have been 
applied. The art icle goes on to consider observed and potent ial lim its on fem inist  
j udicial pract ice, before drawing conclusions about  the com parison between ‘real 
world’ fem inist  j udging and the pract ices of FJPs. 
Key w ords 
Fem inist  j udging;  j udicial interviews;  j udicial studies;  fem inist  m ethods;  fem inist  
j udgm ent  projects 
Resum en 
Los proyectos de sentencias fem inistas, a t ravés de la reelaboración im aginaria de 
sentencias judiciales, han explorado m ult itud de vías en las que las perspect ivas 
fem inistas se podrían aplicar a la práct ica judicial. Pero ¿qué resulta de la 
com paración ent re dichas sentencias y la práct ica real de las juezas fem inistas? Este 
art ículo presenta los resultados de la invest igación em pírica de la autora. Se analiza 
el cóm o,  el cuándo y el dónde de la labor j udicial fem inista, es decir, los recursos, 
herram ientas y técnicas fem inistas que las juezas han ut ilizado, las fases de audiencia 
y tom a de decisión en las que se han ut ilizado y las áreas del derecho en que se han 
This paper draws on work undertaken with several collaborators, in part icular the co-organisers of the 
Aust ralian Fem inist  Judgments Project  who conducted the interviews with Aust ralian judges:  Heather 
Douglas, Tr ish Luker and Francesca Bart let t . I  would like to record my considerable debt  to them, together 
with Danielle Tyson, Kathy Mack, Sharyn Roach Anleu and Er ika Rackley. The judicial interviews were 
made possible by funding from the Aust ralian Research Council, DP 120102375. The paper was originally 
presented at  the Oxat i workshop on Feminist  Judgments:  Comparat ive Socio-Legal Perspect ives on Judicial 
Decision Making and Gender Just ice, and I  would like to thank the organisers of the workshop and editors 
of this collect ion, Kathy Stanchi, Br idget  Crawford and Linda Berger, and the other workshop part icipants 
for their insights, encouragement  and great  company. 
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aplicado. Adem ás, se tom an en consideración los lím ites observados y potenciales de 
la práct ica judicial fem inista, y se ext raen conclusiones sobre la com paración ent re 
la labor j udicial fem inista en el “m undo real”  y la práct ica de los proyectos de 
t r ibunales fem inistas. 
Palabras clave 
Sentencias fem inistas;  ent revistas judiciales;  estudios judiciales;  m étodos 
fem inistas;  proyectos de sentencias fem inistas 
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1 . I nt roduct ion 
The various fem inist  j udgm ent  project s (FJPs)  which are the subject  of this issue of 
the Oñat i Socio-Legal Series have explored a range of ways in which a judgm ent  
m ight  be fem inist , including incorporat ing wom en’s experience into decision-m aking 
and the form ulat ion of legal rules, drawing on fem inist  legal theory and/ or seeking 
to achieve gender j ust ice. At  the sam e t im e these im agined judgm ents aim  to rem ain 
plausible as judgm ents because they observe the sam e const raints on judicial 
decision-m aking that  bind ‘real life’ j udges: 1 they adhere to the doct r ine of precedent , 
work within the law as it  was at  the t im e of the original decision, and use only the 
facts known and the contextual m aterial available at  the t im e. However, one 
const raint  on ‘real life’ j udges which does not  operate within FJPs is the const raint  of 
j udicial ideology – the powerful (albeit  usually unspoken)  norm s and t radit ions within 
a given legal culture concerning the appropriate role of j udges, and the im portance 
of conform ity to those norm s in order to m aintain credibilit y as a judge (Berns 1999, 
Hunter 2015a, pp. 126-129, 132) . Thus, while rewrit ten fem inist  j udgm ents 
powerfully dem onst rate that  original decisions were not  inevitable and cases could 
have been decided different ly, they do not  necessarily m odel how judgm ents would 
be writ ten in realit y. 
I n the ‘real world’ of j udging, debates around the value of j udicial diversity have 
quest ioned whether wom en judges can, should or do m ake a substant ive – as 
opposed to a sym bolic – difference (see, e.g.,  Feenan 2009, Kenney 2013, Rackley 
2013, Hunter 2015a, pp. 124-126) . Som e com m entators have focused solely on the 
sym bolic value of having wom en represented on the form erly m ale bast ion of the 
bench (see, e.g. Malleson 2003) . For exam ple, one of the judges in the interview 
study described below explained that  for  her,  fem inism  sim ply m eant  having wom en 
as judges and showing they were as good as and no different  from  m en (SCA7) . 2 
Others have focused on the fact  that  wom en have different  life experiences to m en, 
and therefore are likely to bring those different  life experiences to their  j udicial role 
and consequent ly m ake law m ore inclusive (see, e.g. Wilson 1990, Hale 2005, 
Etherton 2010, Rackley 2013, ch. 6, Hunter 2015a, p. 124) .   
Som e of us consider that  the substant ive difference fem inist  j udges (as opposed to 
wom en judges per se)  m ight  m ake can go well beyond this. I  developed this 
argum ent  in an art icle t it led Can fem inist  j udges m ake a difference? (Hunter 2008) , 
which was based on the then available literature on fem inist  j udging (see, e.g.,  Boyle 
1985, Sherry 1986, Resnik 1988, Rush 1993, Sheehy 2004)  and was largely 
theoret ical and speculat ive. Since then, I  have been pursuing this quest ion 
em pirically, by invest igat ing the ‘real world’ pract ices and accounts of ‘real life’ 
fem inist  j udges. This art icle presents the fruits of this invest igat ion to date. I t  first  
explains m y data sources and then discusses the findings, which suggest  that  a 
fem inist  perspect ive m ight  be brought  into judging in quite a staggering variety of 
ways. I n order to im pose som e order on this variety, I  analyse the data in term s of 
how, when and where a fem inist - inform ed approach to j udging m ight  be taken. How  
refers to the fem inist  resources, t ools and techniques judicial officers have drawn 
upon. When refers t o the stages in the hearing and decision-m aking process at  which 
these resources, t ools and techniques have been deployed. And where refers to the 
areas of law in which they have been applied. The art icle goes on to consider observed 
and potent ial lim its on fem inist  j udicial pract ice, before finally com paring ‘real world’ 
fem inist  j udging with the pract ices of the FJPs. 
                                                 
1
 The phrases ‘real life’ and ‘real wor ld’ appear in scare quotes throughout in order to t rouble the not ion 
of a fixed, external reality. As the paper demonstrates, the pract ice of judging is situated and cont ingent , 
mult iple rather than monolithic and shift ing rather than t imeless, such that  the separat ion between fict ional 
fem inist  judgments and actual judgments may simply be heur ist ic. 
2
 The code names given to interviewees are explained in the methodology sect ion below. 
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2 . Methodology 
My em pirical observat ions of ‘real world’ fem inist  j udging have included both case 
studies and interviews. Case studies have involved the system at ic study of the 
judgm ents of part icular j udges, exam ining the totalit y of their decisions over a period 
of t im e in com parison with those of their j udicial colleagues, t o discern what , if any, 
difference m ay be evident  in their j udgm ents. This is t im e-consum ing research which 
thus far  has looked at  two Aust ralian judges, Just ice Marcia Neave and Just ice Bet ty 
King. Just ice Neave was a fem inist  academ ic and law reform er prior t o her 
appointm ent  to the Victorian Court  of Appeal in 2006, and I  studied her j udgm ents 
during her first  three years on the bench (Hunter 2013) .  Just ice King was a Victorian 
Suprem e Court  j udge whom  Danielle Tyson and I  ‘discovered’ in our study of 
sentencing decisions in dom est ic hom icide cases in Victoria after the State abolished 
the defence of provocat ion in 2005 (see Hunter and Tyson 2017a) . I n t he course of 
this invest igat ion, it  becam e clear that  Just ice King took a not iceably different  
approach to sentencing from  that  of her colleagues, and we ident ified her approach 
as fem inist  (Hunter and Tyson 2017b) . I  am  also engaged in an ongoing case study 
with Erika Rackley of t he judgm ents of Lady Hale since the incept ion of the UK 
Suprem e Court  in October 2009 (see Hunter and Rackley 2018) .  
The m aj or source for this art icle, however, is a series of interviews conducted in 2013 
as part  of the Aust ralian FJP. As well as producing a book of rewrit ten judgm ents 
(Douglas et  al.  2014a) , t hat  proj ect  set  out  t o invest igate the extent  to which fem inist  
j urisprudence has had an im pact  on Aust ralian law m ore generally. The m ethods 
adopted for this elem ent  of the proj ect  included a series of case studies of areas 
where fem inist  j urisprudence has been inst rum ental in shaping legal developm ents 
(bat tered wom an syndrom e, sexually t ransm it ted debt , sexual harassm ent  and pay 
equity) , a com pilat ion of j udgm ents nom inated by project  part icipants or ident ified 
in fem inist  literature as cont r ibut ing a fem inist  perspect ive to law, 3 and interviews 
with Aust ralian judicial officers. Potent ial interviewees were ident ified as fem inist  or 
as sym pathet ic to fem inism  by m eans of personal knowledge and contacts, and 
snowballing ( recom m endat ions from  other interviewees) . Not  all of those approached 
responded to our let ters of invitat ion or agreed to be interviewed. Ult im ately, we 
conducted interviews with 42 judicial officers, all but  one of whom  were wom en. Six 
were ret ired and the rem aining 36 were current ly sit t ing. All interviews were 
conducted on the basis of anonym ity in the report ing of interview data. 
I nterviewees were drawn from  a variety of different  court  levels and geographical 
areas. I n Aust ralia, the federal court  st ructure consists of:  
 the High Court :  the apex court  in the Aust ralian legal hierarchy and final court  
of appeal from  all Federal, State and Territory court s. The Court  has seven 
m em bers and sits en banc;  
 the Federal Court  of Aust ralia and Fam ily Court  of Aust ralia: 4 superior t r ial 
court s, the form er generalist , the lat ter specialist . I n both cases t r ials are 
conducted by a single judge, and appeals from  a single judge are heard by a 
Full Court  of three judges;  
 the Federal Circuit  Court  of Aust ralia:  an interm ediate t r ial court  with 
j urisdict ion in specified areas. Trials are heard by a single judge;  
 a range of specialist  t r ibunals dealing prim arily with challenges to federal 
adm inist rat ive decisions. Cases are usually heard by a single Tribunal 
m em ber.  
  
                                                 
3
 The case studies and compilat ion of judgments can be found on the Australian fem inist  judgments project 
website at  ht tps: / / law.uq.edu.au/ afjp-case-studies.  
4
 The Fam ily Court  was in operat ion at  the t ime of the interviews;  however at  the t ime of wr it ing the 
government  has announced plans to merge it  with the Federal Circuit  Court . 
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At  State and Territory level there is:  
 a Court  of Appeal in m ost  States, which sits as a bench of three judges, 
hearing appeals from  single judges of the super ior and interm ediate courts;  
 a Suprem e Court :  a superior  t r ial court  of general j urisdict ion in which judges 
sit  alone. Where there is no Court  of Appeal, appeals are heard by a three-
judge Full Court  of the Suprem e Court ;  
 a Dist r ict  Court  or County Court  in the largest  States:  an interm ediate t r ial 
court  which deals with all but  the m ost  serious crim inal offences and the 
largest  civil claim s, and in which judges sit  alone;  
 a Magist rates’ Court  or  Local Court :  a sum m ary t r ial court  which deals with 
the vast  bulk of less serious crim inal cases, lower value civil m at ters and 
dom est ic violence injunct ions, with m agist rates sit t ing alone;  
 a system  of t r ibunals dealing with a range of areas historically assigned to 
specialist  adjudicators, including planning, discrim inat ion, and indust r ial 
relat ions. Tribunals m ay sit  as a single m em ber or as a panel of three 
m em bers.  
All decision-m akers sit t ing on Aust ralian courts are required to be legally qualified, 5 
although this is not  always a requirem ent  for t r ibunal m em bers. Unlike judges, 
m em bers of m ost  t r ibunals do not  have security of t enure, but  are appointed instead 
for  a fixed term . I ncum bents in the lowest  level State and Territory courts are styled 
‘m agist rates’ rather than ‘j udges’. The term  ‘j udicial officer ’ is intended to cover all 
three groups:  j udges, m agist rates and t r ibunal m em bers.  
Our interviews did not  include any of the judges of the High Court .  Further,  six of the 
42 interviewees provided no accounts or exam ples of how fem inism  was relevant  to 
their j udging. The dist r ibut ion am ong federal and State courts of the rem aining 36 
interviewees who are the subject  of this art icle, was as follows:  
TABLE 1 
 Federal State / Territory 
Court  of Appeal n/ a 4 
Superior Court  4 7 
I nterm ediate Court  2 9 
Low er Court  n/ a 9 
Tribunal 5 2 
Table 1 . I nterview ees by court  level and jurisdict ion. 
The num bers in this table add up to m ore than 36, since five of the interviewees had 
experience on m ore than one court  and/ or t r ibunal. I n the following discussion, 
j udicial officers are referred to by a code nam e which incorporates their posit ion in 
the court  system  – F or  S for  Federal or  State/ Territory, and CA (Court  of Appeal) , 
SC (Superior Court ) ,  I C ( I nterm ediate Court ) , LC ( Lower Court )  or T (Tribunal) . 
I nterviewees were drawn from  every State and Territory other than the Northern 
Territory, however geographical indicators are not  included in code nam es order to 
avoid the possibilit y of ident ificat ion, especially in sm all j urisdict ions. 
                                                 
5
 For example, Australian magist rates are salar ied professionals, by contrast  with English magist rates who 
are lay people sit t ing on a voluntary basis. 
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The judicial interviews were sem i-st ructured around a series of interview them es and 
prom pts, and not  all interviews covered all of the prom pts, or covered them  in the 
sam e level of detail. Relevant  prom pts for the purposes of this art icle included:  
 How do your own background, experiences, beliefs and opinions affect  your 
decisions? 
 Do you take ext ra- legal m at ters (e.g. the broader factual context )  into 
considerat ion in your decision m aking? 
 Do you ident ify yourself as a fem inist  j udicial officer?  
I f yes:  What  does this m ean to you? How does this m anifest  in your j udgm ents 
( if at  all)? Have you encountered lim itat ions in being a fem inist  j udge? I f so, 
what  were they? What  m akes it  hard or easy to be a fem inist  j udge? 
I f no:  Do you think there is any room  for a fem inist  approach to j udging? 
 Can you give an exam ple or exam ples of your own judgm ents you would 
consider fem inist? Can you give exam ples of j udgm ents you consider fem inist  
m ade by other j udges (m ale or fem ale)? 
 Have you ever experienced a case where you could not  reach the result  you 
would have liked as a fem inist? Why was this not  possible? 
 Have you ever experienced a case where you afterwards regret ted your 
decision from  a fem inist  perspect ive? 
 Does the nature of the court  or  t r ibunal in which you m ake decisions im pose 
specific lim itat ions on how you go about  writ ing judgm ents? Does it  offer  
possibilit ies not  available in other legal decision m aking contexts? 
 Are there other socio-cultural factors apart  from  gender which you t ry to take 
into account  in your decisions? 
I t  can be seen from  the table above that  the m ajorit y of interviewees sat  on t r ial 
rather than appellate courts,  and this is inevitably reflected in their accounts of 
fem inist  j udicial pract ice, within which writ ing judgm ents form ed only a sm all part . 
I n report ing the interview data, no claim  is m ade that  these responses are in any 
way representat ive or generalisable. Neither is it  claim ed that  interviewees’ pract ices 
always m atched their accounts. Rather, the aim  is to show what  form s of fem inist  
j udging are m anifested ( in the case studies)  and perceived to be possible (by 
interviewees)  in the ‘real world’, even within the const raints of j udicial ideology.  
Finally a note on what  counts as ‘fem inist ’. Fem inism  is a varied and wide- ranging 
set  of ideas, and in this art icle the term  broadly em braces anything that  prom otes 
the interests of wom en, draws on fem inist  theory or is m ot ivated by fem inist  values. 
Thus, for instance, where an interviewee has ident ified a part icular pract ice as 
fem inist  I  have not  sought  to second-guess them , but  I  have som et im es ident ified 
exam ples as fem inist  when the interviewee or case study subject  m ight  not  have. 
Further,  fem inist  values m ay m ot ivate a m ore general hum anism . A concern with 
j udging inclusively is likely to em brace not  only wom en but  other groups who have 
been t radit ionally m arginalised by the legal system , and indeed all lit igants appearing 
before the courts. Im portant ly, the fact  that  som ething m ay be considered fem inist  
( such as a com m itm ent  to equalit y)  does not  m ean that  it  cannot  also be considered 
as an elem ent  of other philosophies (such as liberalism  or ant i- racism ). Fem inism  is 
not  the residue left  over when all other categories have been exhausted. Rather, it  
m ight  well overlap with, and indeed explicit ly draw upon, other progressive agendas 
(see Hunter et  al.  2016) .  
3 . The how  of fem inist  judging 
At  the m ost  general level, interviewees described, and judges were observed, 
drawing on com binat ions of fem inist  epistem ologies, fem inist  values and fem inist  
pract ices in their j udicial work. I n other words, fem inism  influenced how they 
thought , what  they believed, and/ or what  they did and said. 
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3.1. Fem inist  epistem ologies 
For m any interviewees, having a fem inist  consciousness or fem inist  perspect ive was 
a start ing point  which was said to inform  their j udicial thinking generally (FT4, ST6, 
SIC12, SIC19, SLC20, SCA25, SSC29, FSC33, FIC35) , and this was also evident  in 
the judicial case studies. I n the words of one m agist rate, fem inism  “probably inform s 
m y worldview, and so when I ’m  m aking m oral j udgem ents, I ’m  sure that  it  inform s 
m y decision-m aking, as anyone’s background does”  (SLC20) . Or as a superior court  
j udge put  it ,  she has:  
an im m ediate recognit ion of how pervasive are the pat r iarchal paradigm s within 
which people abuse power and use power abusively. So without  having to call it  the 
architecture within which a part icular societal issue has em erged and conflict  ar ises 
to a point  of either the com m ission of a cr im inal or civil wrong, it 's there and I  know 
it . You know it . So we know what  we know and we work with what  we know. (SSC29) 
More specifically, j udicial officers displayed m any of the hallm arks of fem inist  thinking 
as applied to j udging ident ified in m y theoret ical art icle (Hunter 2008, pp. 10-15) . 
They “asked the wom an quest ion” , that  is, not iced how apparent ly neut ral rules and 
pract ices im pact  different ly on wom en (Bart let t  1990, p. 837) ,  and hence perceived 
unfairness in situat ions where a m ale judge m ight  not  (SIC8) . They understood the 
specificit y of wom en’s lives and experiences, including, for exam ple, the gender 
division of labour within fam ilies, the dynam ics of coercive and cont rolling violence 
and the difficulty of leaving an abusive relat ionship, the nature and effects of 
stereotyping, discrim inat ion, harassm ent  and fear, the variety of ways in which 
vict im s of sexual abuse m ight  respond, the harm  of rape, and the experience of 
pregnancy, childbirth, caring for children and m enopause (SSC2, SIC3, FI C13, 
FSC14, SLC17, SIC19, SLC18, SLC20, FT21, SLC30, SLC31, FSC33, FIC35, SIC37, 
SSC39, SSC42;  Hunter and Tyson 2017b, pp. 787-792) . This was part icularly notable 
in one of the cases decided by Just ice Neave, which involved claim s by a wom an 
against  her form er partner for  division of relat ionship propert y, and dam ages for 
serious assaults and breach of confidence. The t r ial j udge dism issed or t r ivialised 
each of these claim s, but  on appeal, Just ice Neave, writ ing for a m ajority of the court , 
dem onst rated a m uch greater understanding of the plaint iff’s posit ion and experience 
and awarded significant ly larger sum s by way of property adjustm ent  and dam ages 
(Giller  v Procopets [ 2008]  VSCA 236, Hunter 2013, pp. 413-417) .  
As well as drawing on their own life experiences as wom en, j udicial officers were 
sensit ive to the life circum stances of wom en very different  from  them selves (SSC2, 
SIC3, SI C36, SSC38, SSC39) . For exam ple one interviewee observed that  although 
a specialist  Drug Court  had been set  up in her State which was designed to take a 
therapeut ic, problem -solving approach to offending, it  was less accessible to wom en 
by virtue of their different  crim inal t rajectories:   
… wom en with terr ible problem s would take longer to com e into the cr im inal just ice 
system , often because they’ve been able to fuel their  drug habit  through their 
boyfr iend and so their offending had been prost itut ion or st reet  prost itut ion, whereas 
the blokes had been doing burglar ies and robberies and then they got  into that , sort  
of, later in life. So you had these really com plex lives, but  with less serious offending 
at  an early stage and t he whole vict im  of being sexually abused and stuff,  how that  
im pacts on people in the way that  they com e through. (SLC37)  
Another noted the need to listen carefully to wom en whose experiences were rem ote 
from  her own:  
I 'm  a white, m iddle class wom an. I  don't  know what  it 's like – it  would be a conceit  
to say I  had any idea what  being a single mother of three kids in [ deprived area]  
would be like or being marr ied to any – it 's a st rongly Arabic area here – being 
m arr ied to any of those gent lem an I ' ll m eet  tomorrow [ in the dom est ic violence list ]  
would be like. So yes, in term s of br inging to the job any kind of insight  about  that  – 
I  m ean, I  guess – perhaps a good fem inist  knows what  they don't  know and doesn't  
pretend that  they know stuff or know what  any wom an goes through. A good fem inist  
j ust  – “yes, tell m e your story” . (SLC30;  see also Cain 1988, p. 1955) 
Rosemary Hunter    Fem inist  Judging… 
 
 
Oñat i Socio- legal Ser ies, v. 8, n. 9 (2018) , 1275-1306 
I SSN:  2079-5971 1283 
Just ice King, in her sentencing judgm ents, dem onst rated a keen understanding of 
the posit ion of I ndigenous wom en who had killed their abusive partners, placing their 
offending in the context  of long histories of vict im isat ion, and rem aining carefully 
non- judgm ental about  the wom en’s own choices in life, while reserving her 
condem nat ion for the m ult iple social system s which had failed to take care of them  
(Hunter and Tyson 2017b, pp. 785, 790-791, 794, 798) . 
I nterviewees’ awareness of difference and the posit ion of those m arginalised within 
society and the legal system  very often extended to groups other than wom en and 
issues other than gender, including race, ethnicity, class, disabilit y, sexual orientat ion 
and age – both as they intersected with gender, as already indicated, and as separate 
considerat ions. As one j udge put  it :  
Being a fem inist  m eans having a m uch m ore open m ind to the barriers and the 
prejudice and the discr im inat ion that  are so subt ly put  in front  of wom en that  you 
can’t  help but  becom e aware of the barr iers and the prejudices and the discr im inat ion 
that  are put  in front  of other people. (FSC14)  
As the quotat ions above indicate, one elem ent  of fem inist  knowledge was a fam iliarit y 
with the social context  within which legal issues com ing before the courts had arisen 
(SIC24, FIC35, Hunter and Tyson 2017b) , and this m ight  include fam iliarit y with 
research evidence on m at ters such as the fem inisat ion of poverty (FIC13) , the 
gendered nature of dom est ic violence (SLC20)  or the cycle of violence (FSC14) . One 
interviewee com m ented on the value of reading academ ic literature in her area of 
specialisat ion:  
I ’ve found that  (…)  the j ournal art icles that  I  could access – other writ ings and 
whatever that  you could look at  – I  m ean, even if you don’t  necessarily use them  or 
reference them  in the decision, they just  broaden your m ind and m ake you think a 
bit  m ore broadly so that  you m ight  approach things in a slight ly different  way t han if 
you didn’t  have access to them . So to that  extent  they’re really, really useful (…) 
even if it  j ust  m akes you have a m ore enquir ing m ind. (ST6) 6 
An appellate judge referred to using her background knowledge of the purpose of 
statutory rape laws, t ogether with research evidence on teenage sexual act ivit y, to 
t ry to shift  the court s’ approach where charges arose from  “ordinary, consensual 
boyfr iend, gir lfriend sex”  from  a focus on the age of the alleged vict im  to a focus on 
whether there was an elem ent  of abuse involved. I n one such case she had circulated 
research art icles to the other j udges and the part ies and invited subm issions on 
sentencing in light  of them  (SCA39) . I n several cases in m y study of her j udgm ents, 
Just ice Neave referred to research evidence, took judicial not ice of notorious social 
facts, or put  the legal issues in their broader context  in order to inform  the court ’s 
decision-m aking, on m at ters such as delayed report ing of child sexual abuse, the 
cycle of violence, the r isk of sexually t ransm it ted infect ions from  unprotected sex and 
the policy background to stalking legislat ion (Hunter 2013, pp. 405-409) . Fem inist  
background knowledge m ight  also include awareness of the United Nat ions 
Convent ion on the Elim inat ion of All Form s of Discrim inat ion against  Wom en 
(CEDAW) and other internat ional hum an rights standards (SIC3) . 
3.2. Fem inist  values 
Brenda Hale has observed that  decision-m aking which prom otes equalit y is 
“consistent  with the fundam ental principles of law”  and as such, can hardly be a 
source of object ion (Hale 2008, pp. 26-27, 2005, p. 286) . I ndeed it  would be difficult  
to object  to any of the fem inist  values em braced by the judicial officers observed and 
interviewed in the studies under discussion:  an ethic of care, inclusivity, equalit y and 
                                                 
6
 One of the referees quest ioned whether interviewees had read any fem inist  judgments and if so, what 
they thought  of them. While most interviewees were support ive of the Aust ralian FJP and expected it  to 
produce interest ing and valuable results, none had read any of the judgments produced by the previous 
Canadian or English projects, although six noted that  they had at tended a presentat ion on the English 
project  given at  the I nternat ional Associat ion of Women Judges’ Conference in London in 2012. 
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j ust ice. While earlier legal fem inist  beliefs that  all wom en judges would display an 
ethic of care by virtue of their gender ( see, e.g., Sherry 1986, p. 580, Resnik 1988, 
drawing on Gilligan 1982)  have clearly proved to be unsustainable, som e fem inist  
j udges do consciously adopt  an ethic of care ( e.g. SIC8)  and others, without  referr ing 
to that  label, evidence an approach towards the people before the court  that  is 
relat ional, connected, caring and responsible rather than abst ract ,  distanced, 
disengaged and legalist ic (e.g. Hunter and Tyson 2017b, and see also Hunter et  al.  
2016) . One of the best -known exam ples of this in the UK is Baroness Hale’s j udgm ent  
in R (on the applicat ion of Gent le and another)  v The Prim e Minister and others [ 2008]  
UKHL 20. Here, the m others of two soldiers killed in I raq sought  to com pel the Prim e 
Minister to establish an independent  public inquiry into the governm ent ’s efforts to 
establish the legalit y of the Brit ish invasion of I raq. Their case was hopeless, but  
unlike the other m em bers of the House of Lords, Hale acknowledged the posit ion of 
the applicants:  
53. Not  surprisingly, the m others of these young m en wanted to know how and why 
their sons had died. The circum stances surrounding their deaths m ust  have raised 
m any quest ions in their  m inds. The Arm y inquir ies took t im e and they did not  feel 
that  they had been kept  fully inform ed. They felt , with som e just ificat ion, that  even 
in a situat ion of arm ed conflict  these part icular deaths m ight  have been avoided. But  
on top of those inquir ies they wanted to know why their sons had been sent  to I raq 
at  all. What  they really want  is an inquiry into whether or not  the conflict  in which 
their sons died was lawful (…) . I f the use of force was lawful, it  would be of some 
com fort  to know that  their sons had died in a just  cause. I f it  was not , there m ight  
at  least  be som e public acknowledgement  and at t r ibut ion of responsibilit y and lessons 
learned for the future. I f m y child had died in this way, that  is exact ly what  I  would 
want . I  would want  to feel that  she had died fight ing for a just  cause, that  she had 
not  been sent  to fight  a bat t le which should never have been fought  at  all, and that  
if she had then som e-one m ight  be called to account . 
This paragraph elicited the com m ent  from  Mrs Gent le that  “only Baroness Hale (…)  
has had the decency to even consider how m y fam ily and I  feel”  (Kalu 2010) . 
A handful of interviewees referred to the value of being inclusive, for exam ple, 
“everything we do, I  think we should t ry and include rather than exclude”  (SSC2) , 
and the not ion that  fem inism  was about  “ t aking everybody’s perspect ive into 
account ”  rather than “privileging a part icular sector of society”  (SIC10) . One noted 
her frequent  references to the Equalit y before the Law Benchbook  (produced by the 
Judicial Com m ission of NSW)  to ensure that  everyone appearing before the court  was 
appropriately recognised and accom m odated. Others talked about  recognising 
inequalit ies and addressing them  as far  as possible within law (SIC3)  or ensuring 
substant ive equalit y (FSC27, SCC29, FSC33) . This was a m at ter raised part icularly 
by fam ily j udges in the context  of substant ive equalit y between breadwinner 
husbands and hom em aker wives in post -separat ion propert y division, but  it  was by 
no m eans confined to that  scenario. I n her sentencing decisions in dom est ic hom icide 
cases, Just ice King stood out  from  her colleagues in st rongly affirm ing wom en’s r ights 
to equalit y and autonom y and cast igat ing m ale defendants who killed in 
circum stances where wom en were at tem pt ing to assert  those r ights:  
Our com m unity,  parliam ent  and the courts have repeatedly said that  wom en are not  
chat tels, they are not  som ething that  is owned by a m an, any m an. Your wife was 
ent it led to leave you. You m ay not  have liked that , but  she had the r ight  to do so. 
She did not  have to tell you where she was going, or if she was pursuing a relat ionship 
with another m an. You had no r ight  to know this, and you had no r ight  to cont rol 
what  she did… (R v Neascu [ 2012]  VSC 388, para. 43)  
One interviewee m aintained that  what  a j udge should do is “ t ry [ for]  t he possibilit y 
of j ust ice” , not  through the indifferent  applicat ion of legal rules but  through at tent ion 
to the part icularit ies of t he lit igants and the issues in each individual case (SIC10) .  
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3.3. Fem inist  pract ices 
I nterviewees described a num ber of general fem inist  pract ices which m ight  be used 
at  any relevant  point  in order t o operat ionalise fem inist  knowledge and values. One 
was acknowledging and engaging with em ot ion rather than taking the m ore 
t radit ional j udicial stance of ( supposed)  dispassionate object ivit y:  
You can in fact  have a different  approach (…) . You could actually engage with the 
em ot ion and grief before the court . You can engage with it . Judges are told they 
m ustn’t . Jurors are told they m ustn’t . I t 's j ust  wrong. I t  is wrong (…) . I t 's why so 
m any people com e out  of court  – both accused and accusers (…)  bat tered by the 
legal process. I f we could – we could st ill do the job of adjudicat ion, but  we could 
engage with the em ot ion and grief. We don’t  have to sound like such * * *  cold 
bastards. (SIC10)  
Likewise, a notable feature of Just ice King’s sentencing judgments was her 
com passion for vict ims and their fam ily mem bers, evident  in her repeated 
acknowledgem ent  of t he devastat ing consequences and t raum a produced by 
dom est ic killings and serious violence. She not  only dem onst rated her understanding 
of the pain and suffering of fam ily m em bers and others connected to the vict im , 
whose lives had been forever changed by the loss of a loved one, but  also 
acknowledged the inabilit y of the sentencing process to alleviate that  pain and 
suffering. Nevertheless, in her sentencing rem arks she sought  t o offer  solace to 
fam ily m em bers and to give them  hope for the future as they cam e to term s with 
their loss (Hunter and Tyson 2017b, pp. 783-787) . 
A second st rategy was act ively seeking inform at ion in order to get  to a fair or  j ust  
result , especially (but  not  only)  in the sentencing process. This m ight  include asking 
about  wom en defendants’ dom est ic situat ion which m ight  not  have been m ent ioned 
by m ale barristers. Were they the prim ary carers of children? How old were their  
children? What  arrangem ents would be m ade for them  if their m other went  to prison? 
(SIC3, also SLC5, SIC36)  I t  m ight  also extend to calling for addit ional psychological 
report s, or other expert  evidence or m aterial that  m ight  support  alternat ives to prison 
(SIC24, SIC37) . Other contexts in which judicial officers m ent ioned they had sought  
further inform at ion included asking for details of the m other’s circum stances in child 
protect ion proceedings (SLC42) , quest ions about  any history of violence or whether 
there were injunct ions in place in fam ily proceedings (FSC14) , and finding m aterial 
on underlying conceptual issues not  addressed by the part ies in im portant  test  cases 
(ST6) . 
A further step involved m aking use of court  resources as part  of a problem -solving 
approach where other sources of assistance were unavailable:  
So you have a wom an with three kids on her  third shoplift , and I  invariably say after 
the first  shoplift , ‘you have got  to talk to your doctor about  this. I  can't  help you 
again’. So yes, that 's problem at ic. Where are these wom en going to go? I t 's an 
illness. There's no social worker report  [ because she can’t  get  Legal Aid] . I  have a 
m ental health clinical nurse here, I  will get  her to talk t o him  (…) . Because she doesn't  
have a – she hasn't  had access to the proper resources, there's m e t rying to fiddle 
around in there to protect  her (…) . I f I  dism iss it  under the Mental Health Act  she is 
put  on a six m onth t reatm ent  plan, which m ight  get  her – if she's profoundly 
depressed and all of the things that  wrap up with that , m aybe six m onths with the 
[ area]  Mental Health Team  will get  her back on t rack. She'll be m edicated or she'll 
get  access to psychologists or psychiat r ists to work through whatever is m aking her 
shoplift . That  m ight  be a good result… (SLC30) 
Another well-established fem inist  judicial st rategy is that  of affirm ing and validat ing 
wom en’s experiences of t raum a, vict im isat ion and abuse, taking care to hear,  believe 
and acknowledge what  has happened to them  and the effects it  has had, and to 
acknowledge that  it  was wrong (SIC8, SCA22, FI C35;  Hunter 2013, pp. 408-409, 
413-417) . An interm ediate court  j udge explained how:  
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I  was doing a lot  of cr im inal com pensat ion work, and it  was all horr ific and (…)  hearing 
these horr ific cases and these shat tered lives, I  decided I  would acknowledge that  
the life was shat tered and that  I  would apologise on behalf of the – by the power 
vested in m e. So I  used to say during m y rem arks – I  would out line, I  would m ake 
visible the pain that  the v ict im  had suffered. Then at  the end I  would say, by the 
authorit y vested in m e as a judge of the [ nam e of court ] , I  apologise to you for  what  
has happened to you. I  hope you will be able to deal with what  has happened to you 
and I  wish you all the best  for the future. (SIC10)  
She acknowledged that  sadly, “ the Bar and m y colleagues found that  hugely, hugely 
cont roversial” , but  saw no valid basis for their concerns. For vict im s of dom est ic 
violence, j udges m ight  acknowledge the effect  on their lives and their parent ing, but  
also the effect  of the court  process it self:  
I  would often write ‘they were deeply dist ressed, they wept ’. I  would put  what  
happened. ‘She wept  throughout  her test im ony. She was deeply dist ressed. I  accept  
that  it 's genuine’.  I  want  t o actually paint  this picture, for those sorts of things, so 
that  any other judge that  com es on the m at ter later, in a year  or two later, or if they 
did appeal – I  want  to paint  a picture in m y judgm ent  of what  it 's been like sit t ing 
watching this, and how it 's been. So I  hope you get  this. I t 's been horr ific for  her. 
And it 's also somet imes a validat ion I  think, when people come into our court  and 
som ething – horr ific behaviour has been happening for years. I  think for  them , if they 
see a judge saying what 's happened to you, it 's been absolutely horr ific. You have 
put  up with all of these things for years. Nonetheless you've cont inued to m aintain a 
relat ionship between the children and the father, and all those things. I  hope in some 
ways it  m akes them  feel som eone's listened, and you've been vindicated. You're a 
good mother… (FIC13)  
And a m agist rate noted the addit ional im portance in a sm all com m unity of sending 
m essages of vindicat ion and support  to vict im s of violence:  
I f a wom an's com e along for instance, and com plained bit ter ly about  som ething that  
happened to her, and she was supported while she was in the court room  but  as soon 
as she'd given her evidence she wanted to get  the hell out  of there, then she's not  
there when you give a decision. I f you don't  say ‘I  believed every word she said, and 
you are absolutely guilt y and you are going to have the book thrown at  you’, that 'll 
get  back to her. So (…)  
There have been t im es when I  have said to a prosecutor, ‘she was a very good 
witness, she was internally consistent , there were som e really difficult  things that  
she had to tell us and she m anaged to get  through it  all okay, but  I  have only got  
(…)  what  she's told m e as against  what  he's told m e (…) . I  can't  be sat isfied beyond 
a reasonable doubt  that  he's guilt y (…) ’. Now even giving that  determ inat ion is going 
to really dist ress her in som e ways. I  don't  want  him  to go away thinking that  he’s 
won because everybody thinks he didn’t  do it . I t  m ay be that  there's a really st rong 
suspicion he did do it , but  it  can't  be proved. So you've got  to modify your words a 
bit  to let  people know that  this case doesn’t  actually change what  happened. This 
case that  the police were able to gather together is not  enough for him  to be 
convicted, but  there is st ill an issue out  there (…) . Som et im es (…)  I  will say to the 
prosecutor (…)  ‘please m ake sure she doesn't  think that  nobody believed anything 
she said’. I  think (…)  in a count ry town, that  becom es very im portant , because the 
quest ion is, is she going to com plain again? I s she going to come in next  t im e? Maybe 
they can get  bet ter evidence next  t im e. (SLC31)  
The flip side of validat ing wom en’s experiences of violence is to hold violent  m en to 
account . This is evident  in the above quotat ion, and was a them e picked up by other 
interviewees (SIC12, FI C13, SLC18, FIC35;  see also Hunter 2013) .  I t  was also a 
them e of Just ice King’s sentencing judgm ents in dom est ic hom icide cases. I n 
response to claim s that  defendants had “ lost  cont rol” , she often ident ified their 
act ions as in fact  the product  of unprovoked anger and rage, and gave lectures on 
the need for m en to cont rol their anger (Hunter and Tyson 2017b, pp. 796-799) , for  
exam ple:  
The com m unity, r ight ly, abhors violence of this level occurr ing as a result  of 
som eone’s anger, our society is const ructed on the basis of people m aintaining self 
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cont rol and respect ing the laws and m ores that  govern our  society. A loss of tem per, 
for whatever reason cannot  excuse or m it igate in any way the seriousness of 
offending of this nature, part icular ly when there is no real explanat ion for the loss of 
tem per or the display of anger. (R v Singh [ 2013]  VSC 47, para. 23)  
Holding to account  m ight  also occur in other areas, such as fam ily responsibilit ies:  
I  rem em ber a part icular one where a wom an had -  t hey were from  Jordan m aybe, I  
can't  rem em ber now. But  she had been m arr ied to him  very young, had a child, 
they'd com e to Aust ralia and he'd left  her. The child was now eight , I  think, and she'd 
rem arr ied som eone else. He suddenly swept  in and put  on an applicat ion for custody. 
I  rem em ber absolutely hosing that  out . The only expression I  can think of is I  sent  
him  away with an absolute flea in his ear.  The child was in court . She was terr ified 
(…) . (SLC30)  
I n addit ion, som e judicial officers sought  t o educate m en about  the unacceptabilit y 
of violence (e.g. SIC24;  Hunter and Tyson 2017b) , and in one case this extended to 
educat ing young wom en about  how to escape a life in which violence was likely to 
feature:  
I  always say to blokes, ‘I  don't  know if you grew up in a house where there was 
violence?’ They'll either say yes or no. I f they say yes then I ' ll say ‘well, you know 
that  lit t le kids work out  how to behave based on what  you do. Lit t le boys work out  
how to t reat  wom en in their  lives. Lit t le girls work out  what  to expect  from  the m en 
in their  lives and if they see you being violent  that 's how they’ll learn (…) .’ You 
certainly get  their  at tent ion because it 's very m uch about  you. ‘Did you grow up in a 
house with violence?’ ‘No I  didn't . ’ ‘Well, why should your kids have to grow up in a 
house with violence?’ (…)  
Young gir ls -  I  m ean part icular ly young wom en, it 's – I  had a funny thing happen a 
few m onths ago where she was in custody. She was all of 18 or som ething. I  said 
(…)  -  she'd left  school and it  was about  – she left  in year nine or som ething – ‘if you 
don't  go back to school – your only t icket  out  of here is educat ion. Your only t icket  
out  of this life and out  of custody is going to be school. Otherwise you're going to 
m ove from  dopey bloke to dopey bloke who will t reat  you badly’. (…)  
So yes (…) , they have a short  at tent ion span and I  don't  have m uch t im e. They're 
the things that  I 've worked out  are probably im portant . (SLC30)  
As well as interact ions with lit igants, fem inist  pract ices typically included interact ions 
with the law. This m ight  involve crit icising gender biased laws or authorit ies, ensuring 
the full im plem entat ion of progressive law reform s (see also Douglas et  al. 2014b, 
pp. 33-34) , and engagem ent  in law reform  act ivit ies (see also Hunter 2008, p. 27) . 
Appellate court  j udges in part icular used their posit ion to crit icise authorit ies 
em bodying rape m yths, even if they did not  have the abilit y to overturn those 
authorit ies. An exam ple given by one judge concerned the High Court  case of Phillips 
v R (2006)  225 CLR 303, a decision on sim ilar fact  evidence (and which was one of 
the judgm ents rewrit ten as part  of the Aust ralian FJP – see Cossins 2014, San Roque 
2014) :  
I  had to deal with Phillips and I  said som ething like – as polite as I  could be, because 
you know you read the High Court  and they alm ost  seem  to be saying there's nothing 
rem arkable about  a bloke t rying to have sex with gir ls even when they don't  want  to 
and being violent  to achieve those aim s (…) . 
So I  forget  how it  cam e up or m aybe I  j ust  had a gratuitous shot  at  it . I  said 
som ething like, ‘well the High Court  obviously didn't  m ean that  because that  would 
be stupid, that  would be such a stupid thing to say that  that  was obviously not  what  
they were saying’. So I  said, ‘what  they m ean is that  it 's not  so except ional so as to 
fall in the sim ilar fact  test ’. There have been cases, there’ve been som e interest ing 
cases to do with again, child sex (…)  and all those assum pt ions about  gir ls will 
com plain and gir ls will report  and gir ls m aking it  up for no reason, all those kinds of 
things. I 've had a bit  of a shot  at  those. I 've had a bit  of a shot  at  som e of the 
defences too because – som e of the consent  issues. (SCA38)  
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Sim ilarly, in one of her cases, Just ice Neave went  as far  as she could to crit icise the 
requirem ent  for a Longm an warning – a warning about  the dangers of convict ing on 
the uncorroborated evidence of a sexual assault  com plainant  in circum stances 
including delayed report ing – while being com pelled to uphold the defendant ’s appeal 
against  the t r ial j udge’s failure to give an adequate warning to the jury (Hunter 2013, 
pp. 412-413) . 
Conversely, where progressive reform s have been enacted, fem inist  j udges have 
been concerned to give full effect  t o their intent ions. This was m ent ioned in interviews 
in relat ion to provisions of the Fam ily Law Act  1975 (Cth)  concerning the equalit y of 
financial and non- financial cont r ibut ions to the m arriage and the effect s of the 
m arriage on a party’s earning capacity (FIC13, FSC27) , and the abilit y to m ake 
exclusion orders under dom est ic violence legislat ion (SLC5) . Likewise, Just ice King 
was the only j udge in our study of dom est ic hom icide cases to applaud the abolit ion 
of the defence of provocat ion, in a case concerning a m an who had killed his wife’s 
new partner:  
you had no r ight  to kill the m an with whom  she had form ed a relat ionship because 
of your anger at  being, as it  was described, ‘cuckolded’. Your relat ionship had been 
well and t ruly over and our society has m oved forward and does not  excuse any 
person on the basis of the cr im e being a ‘cr im e of passion’. Provocat ion has been 
abolished in this State, and r ight ly so. (R v Neascu [ 2012]  VSC 388, para. 43)   
One m agist rate noted how difficult  it  was in com m it tal hearings to give full effect  to 
the provisions of evidence legislat ion which em powered her to protect  com plainants 
from  bullying cross-exam inat ion to enable them  to give their best  evidence. She 
inevitably m et  st rong resistance from  defence counsel, and colleagues told her, “oh 
don’t  bother, it ’s too hard” . But , she concluded, “You think this is j ust  not  fair. The 
legislat ion’s here. I t ’s about  m y bravery in applying the law and being solid”  (SLC18) . 
Several of the judges interviewed had engaged in law reform  act ivit ies, either in areas 
of part icular interest  or as m em bers of general law reform  bodies (e.g. SIC10, SLC18, 
FSC27) . For exam ple, one interm ediate court  j udge dealt  with her frust rat ions about  
the perpetuat ion of rape m yths in higher court  authorit ies, m eaning she was 
“ required by law often to say things [ to j uries]  that  were quite wrong”  by get t ing 
involved in law reform  on the subject  (SIC19) . Another superior court  j udge in her 
law reform  work was able to abolish a part icularly object ionable com m on law doct r ine 
she had encountered in her j udicial role (SSC2) . Notably, t oo, both Brenda Hale and 
Marcia Neave had been law reform ers prior to being appointed to the bench. 7 
4 . The w hen  of  fem inist  judging 
4.1. Making a procedural difference 
Quite a few interviewees, especially those sit t ing on t r ibunals and lower and 
interm ediate courts, ident ified their m ain fem inist  cont r ibut ion as m anaging the 
court room  and conduct ing hearings so as to create a bet ter environm ent  for lit igants 
(e.g. FT4, SI C10, SLC18, FT40, SSC41;  see also Douglas and Bart let t  2016) . This 
m ight  involve generally running hearings in what  was described as “a m ore people 
sensit ive way” , reducing form alit y, enabling claim ants to tell the story they wanted 
to tell and not  feeling int im idated (FT40) , or  not  allowing sexist  language in court  
(FT26) . Alternat ively, it  m ight  involve specific at tent ion to the posit ion of vict im s of 
                                                 
7
 Hale was a Law Commissioner for  England and Wales from 1984-1994. She was the first  woman and the 
youngest  Commissioner to be appointed to the Law Commission. Landmark legislat ion stemming from her 
t ime there includes the Children Act 1989, the Fam ily Law Act  1996 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005. 
Neave chaired the inquiry which led to the legalisat ion of prost itut ion in Victor ia in 1986. She was also a 
part - t ime Commissioner of the NSW Law Reform  Commission and foundat ion chair  of the Victor ian Law 
Reform  Commission, where she was responsible, among other things, for a review of the law of hom icide 
which included the recommendat ion to abolish the defence of provocat ion in Victor ia. After her ret irement 
from the bench in 2014 she chaired the Victor ian Royal Commission into Fam ily Violence. 
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dom est ic and sexual violence (see also Douglas 2016) . Part icular exam ples of the 
lat ter included:   
… just  sim ple things, for exam ple, like acknowledging vict im s. Making vict im s – and 
this applies to vict im s of both sexes, of course, but  often wom en are the vict im s of 
sexual m at ters – m aking them  feel com fortable and encouraging them  to give their 
evidence in a relaxed fashion. Making the experience less oppressive for them . 
(SSC41)  
As discussed above in relat ion to the im plem entat ion of evidence legislat ion, j udges 
were concerned to prevent  the abusive cross-exam inat ion of vict im s (FI C13, SLC18) , 
and also to prevent  counsel from  engaging in prejudicial quest ioning or m aking 
prejudicial statem ents based on rape m yths or stereotypes (SSC42, SLC18) . As an 
interm ediate court  j udge explained:  
when I  am  doing cases like rape cases, sex cases, I  am  careful to m ake sure that  the 
barr isters aren’t  feeding the jury stereotypical argum ents that  aren’t  necessarily 
cogent , I  would suppose would be the word. Such as, we used to have this barr ister 
who at  90 was st ill pract ising and doing a lot  of sex cases. I  often used to have to 
send the jury out  so I  could say, ‘you can't  subm it  that  because she was wearing a 
G-st r ing she was consent ing to the rape’. Then we would have these long argum ents 
because he couldn’t  quite see that  that  was a problem . (SIC12)  
Judges m ight  also proact ively ensure that  special m easures such as screens or 
rem ote witness facilit ies were available when needed, and be alert  t o slight  lines in 
the court room  to avoid int im idat ion, for  exam ple:  
… if the need arose for a rem ote witness room  or som ething of that  nature, to raise 
that . I t  can be even down to where people are sit t ing in the court room . I  m ean, you 
could have a situat ion where, for exam ple, j ust  because of where our dock is 
posit ioned in the court room , an accused m ight  be sit t ing at  one end of the dock. That  
m ight  be m aking things a lit t le uncom fortable. Or the counsel m ay be standing in a 
posit ion facing the witness so that  the witness has to look at  the accused. Well, I  
would -  if that  developed (…)  the next  available opportunity I  would ask counsel to 
m ove so the witness didn't  have to have the accused in their  line of sight  if that  was 
obviously causing a discom fort  or I  was concerned that  it  m ay. Or you m ight  have a 
situat ion which I  can think of where a fam ily of the accused have sat  behind Crown 
counsel in a court room  so that , from  the video link, the child is looking at  Crown 
counsel, and behind Crown counsel are sit t ing the fam ily of the accused (…) . I  would 
want  to know what  that  child could see. I  would be pret ty proact ive about  dealing 
with that . (SSC42;  also SLC18)  
Other st rategies m ent ioned included assist ing dist ressed witnesses by giving them 
breaks and ensuring they have a support  person with them  (SIC37) , and excusing 
int im idated vict im s from  appearing in court  (SLC18, SLC20) . As explained by a 
m agist rate, when seeking a dom est ic violence injunct ion:  
… the [ applicant ’s]  at  court  but  she doesn’t  – she’s too scared to com e into the 
court room . They’ve got  secure wait ing room s and I  don’t  require them  to com e in if 
there’s usually a lawyer represent ing them , or the police are effect ively there (…) . I f 
the respondent ’s consent ing to the order, I  don’t  need her to be re- t raum at ised by 
com ing into court  and seeing him . (SLC20)  
The sam e m agist rate described other innovat ions she was t rying to int roduce to 
im prove the court  exper ience for wom en:   
… a lot  of people in the Magist rates’ Court  m ight  think that  it ’s not  their  problem  how 
people experience court . Or is that  -  do you think that  idea’s disappearing or… ? 
Well they’d probably think yeah, it ’s not  som ething that  they can do anything about , 
whereas going back to the intervent ionist / act ivist  role, I  – one of m y bugbears in life 
is to im prove our IT system s so that  we can interface with the com m unity (…)  so 
that , for exam ple, a wom an in refuge can fill out  an applicat ion for [ a dom est ic 
violence injunct ion]  online (…) . I n the com fort  and securit y of her refuge, and m aybe 
not  even have to com e to court . (SLC20)  
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Som e interviewees located their approach to court room  m anagem ent  within a 
broader com m itm ent  t o procedural j ust ice, entailing concerns with how lit igants 
experience the court  process and ensuring fairness for all part icipants (SIC8, SI C12, 
SLC17, SIC19, SIC23;  see also Hunter et  al. 2016) . For instance, one t r ial court  j udge 
explained how she at tem pted to engage direct ly with defendants, even in sentencing:  
I  st ill speak to people and include the offender who I ’m  sentencing. I  tend to speak 
to them  direct ly about  som e m at ters and engage them  in the sentencing process. I  
don’t  cut  their  lawyer out . I ’m  likely to say som ething – say, for exam ple, I ’ve got  a 
pre-sentence report  to say that  som e offender has – he has a six m onth old baby 
who he’s very, very happy with, then I  m ay in m y sentencing com m ent  and say, 
‘your lit t le girl is six m onths old now’.  I  say, ‘is she six m onths old st ill or is she…?’ – 
and get  them  to clar ify exact ly how old and things like that . So I ’ll engage in 
som ething that ’s not  going to be cont roversial like length of sentence or 
circum stances of offence or som ething like that . But  I  like to, even when sentencing 
people to pr ison, to show that  I ’ve acknowledged that  they exist  as a person. (SI C37)  
Other interviewees m ent ioned their interest  in therapeut ic j urisprudence and 
problem -solving approaches which aim  to m ake the court  process helpful rather than 
harm ful to lit igants, and seek to address lit igants’ problem s holist ically rather than 
focusing narrowly on the legal issues and ‘processing’ people through the system  
(FT4, SLC5, SLC17, SLC20, SLC30, SIC36, SI C37, SSC41;  see also Hunter et  al. 
2016, ident ifying both overlaps and dist inct ions between procedurally j ust , 
therapeut ic and fem inist  approaches to j udging in lower courts) .  
A final procedural aspect  in which values of procedural j ust ice, therapeut ic 
j urisprudence, inclusivity or an ethic of care m ight  com e into play is in the writ ing of 
j udgm ents, in term s of how a decision is expressed and conveyed, and in part icular, 
the way in which lit igants are addressed and wr it ten about :  
The prim ary audience [ for  a j udgm ent ]  has to be the part ies:  they're the ones who 
are the subjects of the dispute, and they're the ones who want  the mat ter dealt  with.  
So, that  m ust  be your pr im ary audience (…) . Showing them  good faith, I  think m eans 
writ ing in a way that  they can understand, using language that  they will understand 
(…) . I t  also m eans, I  think (…)  that  you're careful and caring about  how you write 
about  them , because this is an enduring record – public record – for them .  So, if you 
m ake adverse findings about  them , which we often have to, or a com m ent  on their 
character, or their  conduct , or explain why we have not  accepted some evidence that  
they've given, and accepted cont rary evidence given by som ebody else, that  we do 
so in kind term s. (SIC8)  
Several interviewees had sat  as coroners and one explained how she approached 
inquest  j udgm ents:  
I  always give a narrat ive about  the person. I  usually start  (…)  with giving at  least  a 
short  descript ion about  who died and who they were as a person and what  their 
interests were, because I  think – for exam ple if it 's a suspicious or whether it 's a 
hospital death, there's always a loved one there. The person is either a son, a 
daughter, a brother, a sister, a m other, a father. They're som ebody to som ebody, to 
som eone out  there. To just  reduce them  to volum es of m aterial about  their  blood 
pressure, their  heart  rate, or what  their  final days or who threw the first  punch, really 
does t r ivialise a whole set  of circum stances that  are their lives. So I  think it 's 
im portant  to flesh them  out . We give (…)  the fam ily an opportunity to tell you about  
their  loved one. So I  think it 's im portant  to let  them  know that  they've been heard in 
relat ion to that  and you flesh them  out  and you've given them  som e – a concept  of 
who they are. (SLC28)   
Another j udge noted that  in a case involving evidence from  a num ber of wom en 
workers, she had t r ied to reference each of the witnesses in her decision so they 
could see that  their cont r ibut ion was valued, and the effort  they had put  into their 
evidence was validated (ST6) . Just ice King’s sim ilar approach to acknowledging 
vict im s in her sentencing judgm ents has been discussed above. Caring for lit igants 
m ight  also require a judge to leave things out  of her decision so as not  to belabour 
the appalling experience to which a vict im  of violence had been subjected, or t o 
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protect  a witness. A t r ibunal m em ber, for exam ple, was concerned about  the posit ion 
of wom en who gave evidence cont rary t o that  of their husbands in som e cultural 
contexts:  
I f they cont radict  each other you've got  to take into account  they're operat ing in a 
very pat r iarchal society so the consequences of her cont radict ing his evidence and 
that  affect ing his case (…)  it  was som ething that  always used to worry m e. 
So it  would influence how you would express the m aterial in the decision? You'd leave 
it  out  if you possibly could? (…)  I f you thought  it  was dangerous to her to have it  
there? 
I f I  could, yes. Som et im es you just  couldn't  do that  because it  was cr it ical to the 
case. 
Do you think other t r ibunal m em bers approached this the sam e way…? 
No, I  don't  think all t r ibunal m em bers are as sensit ive on that  issue. There m ay be 
other ways of get t ing evidence or reaching a conclusion on a case without  going down 
avenues of inquiry which are going to be dangerous for the fam ily unit  or part icular ly 
for the wom an. (FT21)    
4.2. Making a difference in decision-m aking 
As described by interviewees, a fem inist  approach m ight  be brought  in at  any point  
in the process of decision-m aking process. Fem inist  knowledge and values m ight  
inform  decisions on the adm issibilit y of evidence, assessm ents of credibilit y, the 
analysis of fact s and evidence, the form ulat ion of j ury inst ruct ions, the exercise of 
discret ion, the interpretat ion of legislat ion, the applicat ion of precedent , the 
developm ent  of the com m on law, the developm ent  of sentencing considerat ions and 
the assessm ent  of dam ages. They m ight  also be brought  into conversat ions with 
other j udicial officers and in turn influence their thinking.  
Decisions on adm issibilit y were cited by several j udicial officers as a site at  which a 
fem inist  perspect ive m ight  be influent ial (FT4, SIC10) . A judge who said that  her 
decision-m aking was generally inform ed by ‘m y fem inist  soul’ noted, for exam ple, 
that  unlike som e of her j udicial colleagues, she was prepared to receive allegat ions 
of fam ily violence in fam ily law cases and would not  dism iss or m inim ise them  
(FIC35) . On appeal, too, Just ice Neave brought  a fem inist  sensibility to bear in 
dealing with object ions to the adm ission of evidence at  t r ial. I n the case of R v Abela 
[ 2007]  VSCA 22, one of the grounds for the defendant ’s appeal against  his convict ion 
for  the rape of his partner was the fact  that  the t r ial j udge had admit ted evidence of 
his recent  sexual assault  of his partner’s daughter.  He argued that  t his evidence 
should not  have been adm it ted because it s prejudicial effect  outweighed it s probat ive 
value. However Just ice Neave held that  the evidence had a very high probat ive value, 
not ing that  “ it  is difficult  to envisage an event  which is likely to have a greater  effect  
on the com plainant ’s willingness to part icipate in sexual act ivit y with the applicant ”  
( [ 2007]  VSCA 22, para. 75) . Since there was no other, less prejudicial way of placing 
the act  of sexual intercourse com plained of within it s proper context , t he judge had 
correct ly adm it ted the evidence. The other m em bers of the court  agreed with her, 
with one conceding that  he would have been inclined to find in the defendant ’s favour, 
but  on reflect ion, he was persuaded by Just ice Neave’s reasoning to dism iss the 
appeal on this ground ( [ 2007]  VSCA 22, para. 6) . 
Credibilit y assessm ents were frequent ly m ent ioned by interviewees as being 
inform ed by a fem inist  perspect ive. This m ight  relate to a witness’s dem eanour ( “ I  
will perceive a wom an giving evidence to be forthright  and helpful and som ebody else 
will perceive her t o be quite different  t o that ” :  FT4) , their consistency, or the content  
of their assert ions – very often related to dom est ic violence. On the issue of 
consistency, one interviewee noted:  
when there's an inconsistency between two accounts, you ask yourself why. Now I  
hope I  did it  with a m an as well but  m ight  there be a really good reason you told the 
Rosemary Hunter    Fem inist  Judging… 
 
 
Oñat i Socio- legal Ser ies, v. 8, n. 9 (2018) , 1275-1306 
I SSN:  2079-5971 1292 
police som ething the night  they cam e round and what  you're now saying that  
happened? Does it  m ean you were lying when you're saying what  you said now, 
because you told the police som ething different? I  mean there's m asses of research 
about  this sort  of stuff. Migrant  people who won't  tell the police – if you've com e from 
Som alia or m any places, you're not  going to tell the police about  your husband being 
violent . He'll get  sent  back there and be killed, you'll probably be killed by him  (…) . 
Well it 's t rying to realise that  that  m ay not  be the whole story and that  when 
som ebody, with support , says this is what  happened, you don't  autom at ically say oh 
yeah, that 's what  happened. But  you don't  either say, well why didn't  you tell that  to 
those two police that  cam e round at  three in the m orning? (SLC14)  
Others said they started with the belief that  dom est ic violence allegat ions are real, 
and are not  m ade up by wom en in order t o gain an advantage in fam ily law lit igat ion 
(FSC33, FIC35) . As discussed earlier, Just ice Neave took a m uch m ore posit ive view 
of the claim ant ’s credibilit y in Giller v Procopets [ 2008]  than the t rial j udge had done. 
I n part icular, in response to his assessm ent  that  Ms Giller had exaggerated the effects 
of the assaults on her, Just ice Neave noted:  
Ms Giller ’s determ inat ion and her failure to be cowed by Mr Procopets’ assaults is not  
inconsistent  with her fearing him  and suffer ing m ental dist ress as a result  of the 
violence she suffered. I t  cannot  be doubted that  the vict im  of such an assault  would 
have feared for her own safety. Nor are the m ental dist ress and fear caused by such 
an assault  dim inished by the fact  that  she did not  seek m edical t reatm ent . (Giller v 
Procopets [ 2008]  VSCA 236, para. 486)  
Conversely, as suggested above, Just ice King tended to be scept ical of m en’s vict im -
blam ing and other excuses and just ificat ions offered for violent  at tacks in dom est ic 
hom icide and serious assault  cases, and she also subjected defendants’ claim s to 
m it igat ion on the basis of their rem orse to close and crit ical scrut iny (Hunter and 
Tyson 2017b, pp.799-802) . 
The analysis of facts and evidence includes assessm ents of credibilit y but  also 
includes assessm ents of plausibilit y and understandings of hum an behaviour. Writ ing 
in 1995, Reg Graycar quest ioned the sources of j udges’ knowledge of t he world and 
suggested that  such knowledge was (m asculine)  gendered (Graycar 1995) . Fem inist  
j udges, therefore, are in a posit ion to correct  this im balance. Exam ples given by 
interviewees again concerned dom est ic violence, and also m ental health:  
… what  I  do know now from  all of this t raining and t hinking about  it  and listening to 
all of the things I ’ve listened to over the years is that  I  now well know and accept  the 
cont rolling behaviour as part  of a pat tern of fam ily violence (…) . I t ’s not  an 
assum pt ion therefore, because she says he cont rols m e, that  it  is fam ily violence. I  
need to know m ore behind it  st ill.  But  I ’m  already accept ing that  cont rol is fam ily 
violence because of the t raining.   
I  see, yes. So the quest ion is whether she’s being cont rolled (…)  not  whether 
cont rolling is a form  of fam ily violence, which is a step ahead of lots of people? 
Yes (…)  I  accept  that  that ’s the case. I  don’t  have t o be convinced about  cont rol. 
(SLC18)  
I  have to m ake a lot  of assessm ents of r isk, of people's r isk to them selves or t o the 
com m unity. I  think how you assess r isk, your percept ions of wom en, the role of 
wom en, the violence they m ight  be exposed to, anything like that , your thoughts 
about  that  are going to inform  your assessm ent  of the level of r isk that 's there (…) . 
But  as I  said, I  think t hat 's one of the views that  I  br ing to things. I  [ also]  br ing v iews 
about  disabilit y and the value of people's lives. (FT4)  
Just  as judges’ fem inist  knowledge inform ed their own fact - finding, so they m ay also 
t ransm it  that  knowledge to j uries to inform  the jury’s fact - finding in crim inal cases. 
For exam ple one judge, thinking about  the difficult ies for com plainants of speaking 
in court  about  what  had happened to them , advised juries:  “ I  tell them  that  they’re 
going to be assessing people’s dem eanour, but  that  people – you know, that  
everybody is different ,  som e people feel really nervous, and go through that ”  
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(SIC37) . Another sought  to counter m andatory jury direct ions she considered 
problem at ic with perm issible com m ents of her own:  
if the law directed m e to say that  (…)  a com plainant 's credibilit y could be affected by 
the lack of t im ely com plaint , I  would say (…)  ‘this is a com m ent  of m ine, but  you m ay 
think a counter-argum ent  is – but  there m ay be good reasons’, etc. So you're allowed 
to m ake a com m ent  provided you m ake it  very clear that  it  was a com m ent  and your 
own view, and that  the jury wasn't  bound to accept  that  com m ent . (SI C19)  
The exercise of discret ion, as a m at ter ent irely within the dom ain of the judge, was 
often m ent ioned as an area of decision-m aking inform ed by fem inist  knowledge and 
values. This m ight  affect  the weight  given to various factors, for  exam ple, in fam ily 
law parent ing or financial cases, or  in sentencing (SCA9, SIC10, FSC14, SLC20, 
FSC33) . An interm ediate court  j udge cited a case in which she had considered that  
the fact  that  the defendant  was breast feeding a baby was m ore im portant  than her 
st r ing of prior  convict ions, result ing in her decision to hand down a non-custodial 
sentence (SIC8) . A fam ily j udge gave an exam ple of a custody dispute in which the 
father argued that  the m other was unfit  to care for  the children:   
I t  was a case where a m an had – an Aust ralian m an, who was – belonged to the 
Merchant  Navy, so he was away a bit  – had a Filipino wife, and they had two lit t le 
gir ls. He decided to leave her. He had fam ily support , she didn't  (…) . The husband 
brought  evidence that  at  a t im e when he was away at  sea, she had worked in a 
brothel. She said that  she only washed the towels and did the recept ion work. So 
they got  a private detect ive to go in and take advantage of her services, which were 
actually m ore than she had said they were. Then brought  – this pr ivate detect ive 
cam e to the court  and said (…) . And I  said to the barr ister for the husband, ‘he's left  
her without  any financial support . What  is she supposed to do? I f this is the job she 
can get  (…) ’ ‘Oh surely, you wouldn't  say that  a prost itute was a suitable parent?’ I  
said ‘why not?’ He said ‘well, it 's socially unacceptable’. I  said ‘oh, is it? What  does 
that  m ean?’ (…)  Because I  thought ,  how dare this m an go and leave her wit hout  
m eans of support  for herself or the children, then turn round and be cr it ical of the 
kind of lifestyle that  (…)? And I  did feel in som e ways that  being a wom an m ade a 
difference there. (FSC33)  
While t r ial court  j udicial officers – especially those below superior court  level – largely 
m ake decisions about  facts and have lit t le scope to develop as opposed to apply the 
law, superior  and appellate court  j udges do have opportunit ies for  legal decision-
m aking, whether via statutory interpretat ion or developing the com m on law to apply 
to new circum stances. I n one of her leading judgm ents on the Suprem e Court , for 
exam ple, Lady Hale overturned a line of lower court  cases which had held that  local 
authorit ies’ statutory dut ies to rehouse anyone m ade hom eless as a result  of 
dom est ic “violence”  extended only to vict im s of physical violence. She found that  the 
legislat ion was not  intended to be so confined, and interpreted it  to extend to all 
form s of abuse giving r ise to the r isk of harm , in line with contem porary 
understandings of dom est ic violence m ore generally (Yem shaw v London Borough of 
Hounslow  [ 2011]  UKSC 3) . As noted above, Just ice Neave’s cases included purposive 
interpretat ions of stalking legislat ion and de facto property legislat ion (Hunter 2013,  
pp. 408, 414) . And several interviewees gave exam ples of decisions in which their 
fem inist  understanding of the legislat ive purpose of,  for exam ple, fam ily law and ant i-
discrim inat ion legislat ion, had inform ed their interpretat ions (FSC14, SIC19, FSC27, 
ST32) . One cited a case in which she had interpreted a sect ion of her State’s crim inal 
injuries com pensat ion legislat ion which provided that  in order to be awarded 
com pensat ion, the vict im  of crim e m ust  not  them selves have been com m it t ing a 
crim inal offence. 
I  said well, that  sect ion couldn't  possibly m ean that  if you happen to have some 
cannabis in your pocket , you walk into the bank and you get  shot  by a bank robber, 
you can't  get  cr im inal inj ur ies com pensat ion. So I  interpreted it  as saying the two 
things would have to be linked before you could lose your r ight  to cr im inal injur ies 
com pensat ion. I  interpreted it  in a case where the facts were that  a wom an was 
sm oking m etham phetamine with a fr iend of her housem ate and then the fr iend raped 
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her. I  said the fact  that  she had been sm oking m etham phetam ine with him  was totally 
disconnected and to award com pensat ion I  had to interpret  that  sect ion like that . But  
the Court  of Appeal said I  was wrong and so did the High Court  (…) . (SIC36)  
I n relat ion to developing the com m on law to be inclusive of wom en one interviewee 
asked rhetorically:  
I f terra nullius can be over turned when it  was upheld for such a long t im e but  t hen 
there was a different  way of thinking about  that , 8 why can’t  you do that  in relat ion 
to wom en’s issues or other social j ust ice issues? (ST6)  
And it  was a clear possibilit y for  this appellate judge:  
… it  com es into play in all decision m aking where you have got  opt ions about  which 
way you could go and which way you can develop the law, slight ly this way or that  
way. There is often a lit t le bit  of leeway. I t ’s not  that  t here is just  one possible answer 
to the case that ’s r ight  and no other answer. Most  cases aren’t  like that . Most  cases 
you have got  room  to m ake different  decisions that  will affect  the ult im ate decision. 
(SCA9)  
Two interm ediate court  j udges m ade specific ment ion of opportunit ies to extend the 
law of torts, in one case to provide redress to a vict im  of sexual violence:  
I 'd always seen [ the com m on law]  as being reflect ive of this older, t radit ional m ale 
norm , and was in fact  in som e ways incredibly sexist  and racist  and classist . So I 'd 
been a great  believer in legislat ive change to reflect  contemporary values rather t han 
the com m on law (…)  I  thought  it  was too m uch infused with the individual values and 
often unexam ined ones of those who were writ ing the judgm ents. But  when I  got  the 
opportunity (…)  to see if the [ law could be developed to apply]  to the circum stance 
of the part icular case, I  found it  could. So I  thought , m aybe som et im es, as a judicial 
officer, you can get  the com m on law to work and to nudge it  in the direct ion of what  
you see as contem porary values, rather than what  som eone of a different  background 
does. (FIC19)  
And in the second case to lim it  rest r ict ions on recovery:  
On one occasion t he issue was whether a person had a r ight  to dam ages where the 
person herself was involved in unlawful conduct .  The issue was that  a young 
Aboriginal gir l didn't  know how to get  hom e after having been drinking in the cit y 
with others and she didn't  have m oney so she wired a car to go hom e. She obviously 
com m it ted an offence. But  then as she and her sister were going to dr ive peacefully 
hom e in this car  her uncle cam e and said ‘look, I  want  this car for m e and m y fr iends’. 
They all squeezed in and because of her background she didn't  feel like she could 
challenge the uncle. So she let  him  drive and he was drunk. He started driving crazily 
and she said ‘stop, stop’ repeatedly and ‘let  m e out ’ but  he didn't  and eventually 
drove into a pole. She becam e a quadriplegic. So the whole issue was whether she 
could be given dam ages because she was involved in – had com m it ted an offence 
herself. 
I  wrote a judgm ent  on the basis of saying that  she should be given dam ages – it  was 
a legal argum ent  but  essent ially on the basis that  she had asked him  to stop and she 
had therefore stopped her illegal act ivit y. I t  was also not  on a frolic of com mit t ing 
offending, because in previous cases the judges had always said look, we can't  give 
dam ages to som ebody who's out  on a frolic of their own, going on a car chase or 
dr iving crazily and then get t ing injured. I  said look, this is a different  situat ion. This 
wom an adm it ted she stole a car but  she was just  t rying to get  home. I  was overturned 
by the Court  of Appeal but  the High Court  eventually upheld it , not  quite on the sam e 
point  that  I  had m ade. (SI C36)  
I n addit ion to set t ing their own precedents, interviewees gave exam ples of st rategies 
they had used to evade bad precedents, including reading and finding important  gaps 
                                                 
8
 Terra nullius was the legal doct r ine which held that  the Aust ralian cont inent  was empty – land belonging 
to no-one – when it  was set t led by the Br it ish in 1788. I t  was on this basis that  English law was imported 
to the Aust ralian colonies and Abor iginal law was disregarded. The doct r ine was overturned in Mabo v 
Queensland (No 2)  (1992)  175 CLR1, enabling pre-exist ing ‘nat ive t it le’ to be ‘recognised’ by Aust ralian 
law to the extent  that  it  cont inued to subsist . 
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in the research on which a part icular authority had been based (FSC14) , and paying 
lip service to a High Court  decision in the wording of j udgm ents while not  actually 
changing the underlying approach to discret ionary decision-m aking which the High 
Court  had disapproved (FSC27) . 
I n relat ion to sentencing, in addit ion to exercising their discret ion in weighing up the 
various sentencing factors, j udges m ight  also develop new sentencing factors or 
general sentencing considerat ions based on fem inist  understandings. Two judges, for 
exam ple, m ent ioned that  they had established the failure to wear a condom  as an 
aggravat ing factor in rape and at tem pted rape cases, due not  only to creat ing the 
r isk of pregnancy, but  also the exposure of the com plainant  to the r isk of cont ract ing 
a sexually t ransm it ted infect ion (SIC19, SCA22) . A third described how she had 
changed the approach to sentencing for child sexual offences:  
There used to be these weird odd cases that  said there were a variety of things that  
you had to take into account  in deciding whether the offence was serious. One of 
them  was – and they were just  a list  of random  factors. One of them  was whether 
there had been a loss of virginit y. I  thought  I  don't  know if that  would be at  the top 
of m y m ind if m y spouse has being abusing for 15 years. So it  was at  m y init iat ive 
(…)  that  we had another look at  why this was serious, because with the benefit  of 
hindsight  you can look at  the effect  on a child's self-esteem . We talked about  some 
of the consequences that  we'd seen com ing through in the vict im  im pact  statem ents 
and they related to things like what  the relat ionship is and the abuse of t rust .  So it 's 
re-characterising the offence to say this isn't  about  sex so m uch, this isn't  about  loss 
of a child's sexual innocence, it 's the loss of a child's needs and r ights to be protected 
and bodily integrit y and a sense of ident it y and all those sorts of things (…) . So it  
was a m at ter of j ust  br inging a new understanding to give it  totally your own 
fram ework. (SSC39)  
A fem inist  perspect ive m ight  inform  the process of assessing dam ages in term s of 
understanding the nature of gendered harm s, and the assum pt ions m ade about  
future econom ic loss. As discussed above, Just ice Neave’s appreciat ion of the harm  
arising from  assaults and breach of confidence in Giller v Procopets [ 2008]  was 
substant ially different  from  that  of the t r ial j udge and resulted in substant ially higher 
dam ages for  the plaint iff. Another j udge observed that  in a breach of privacy case 
concerning a rape vict im  who had been nam ed by a m edia out let :  
I t  had caused her  considerable dist ress, part icularly because the rape was her 
husband, so it  becam e known within her com m unity and circle of fr iends and fam ily 
and acquaintances. So she'd lost  her abilit y to have cont rol over who knew and the 
circum stance in which they knew, and had set  back her  recovery from  that . So to 
have a fem inist  j udge who understood the reason – not  the old paternalist ic reason 
for protect ing the ident it y of a rape vict im  – nam ely, she'd lost  her m arketable quality 
as a wife and her reputat ion for chast it y m ight  have suffered – but  rather, cont rol 
over who knows so that  you're able to becom e a survivor and not  feel a vict im  (…) . 
My views and beliefs about  this and m y understanding about  it  (…)  m eant  that  m y 
approach to the value of her suffer ing m ay well have been different  from the 
approach of som ebody else who m ight  have said, well, her parents knew anyway, 
som e of her fr iends knew anyway – where's the harm ? (SI C19)  
Several j udges talked about  how in assessing dam ages they had not  accepted 
t radit ional assum pt ions about  wom en’s future earning capacity:   
We used to have cases where it  would be said that  in the working out  of dam ages for 
a fem ale, that  their  dam ages would be confined after they got  m arr ied and after they 
had children, because they give up work – don't  they, as we all know [ laughs]  – is 
the argum ent  that  is being put . [ W] hen that  argum ent  has been put  to m e in court  I  
have said, ‘if  you're going to m ake that  subm ission I  want  to know what  the evidence 
is that  this plaint iff who said that  she would go back to work will not  go back to work. 
What  is your evidence upon which you can m ake that  subm ission?’ I  only had to 
m ake that  point  reasonably st rongly a couple of t imes and people knew they weren't  
going to get  very far  with it . That  style of argum ent  has just  gone. I t 's gone, perhaps 
because you have judicial statem ents to that  effect  (…) . But  I  reckon (…)  those sorts 
of argum ents were st ill being m ade, notwithstanding the fact  that  m ost  of us 10 or 
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15 – m any, m any, m any fem ales, a m ajorit y I  would have thought  but  at  least  a 
significant  proport ion, went  back to work after they had children. Such that  you just  
could not  m ake that  assum pt ion in the course of a case and you couldn't  fashion your 
dam ages order based upon that  assum pt ion. (SCA25;  also FT4)  
An im portant  point  m ent ioned by a num ber of interviewees at  which their fem inist  
perspect ive cam e into play was in cont r ibut ing to j udicial conversat ions, both out  of 
court  and on the bench, and hence having an input  into individual as well as collect ive 
decision-m aking (e.g. SSC2, SCA22, SIC36, SIC37, SSC38, SSC39) . A t r ibunal 
m em ber reflected that  the fact  that  m em bers had a variety of different  backgrounds 
and experiences im proved decision-m aking. While she m ight  bring her own views, 
“ inevitably [ a m ale colleague]  thinks from  a different  perspect ive and I  think that  
then your decision-m aking is m ore sound as a result  of that . People quest ion you. 
You quest ion them  about  why you've reached that  view”  (FT4) . Som e went  further 
and talked about  the im portance of educat ing other m em bers of their courts. A 
m agist rate referred to “ t rying to get  som e of the blokes on the court  to see things a 
bit  m ore broadly”  (SLC31) . A t r ibunal m em ber noted:  
I  think I ’ve been generally lucky with the people that  I ’ve worked with. Because we 
generally respect  one another and respect  each other’s view you can have those sorts 
of discussions and people will listen to what  you say. They m ightn’t  agree with you 
but  they will at  least  listen to what  you say. Usually we can find som e consensus 
posit ions. I  know on [ issues concerning wom en’s em ploym ent ] , it  really has been an 
educat ive role. (ST6)  
And an appellate judge cited instances of persuading her colleagues to take a 
different  view:  
there have been a num ber of occasions in which I  think – because I 've seen (…)  
things through a part icular lens – that  I 've either been able to persuade others of a 
result  that  otherwise m ight  not  have been reached. That  part icular ly relates to 
wom en’s earning capacity and wom en's abilit y to perform  tasks and wom en's – and 
these are very specific exam ples I 'm  now giving you because they cam e out  of 
part icular cases. (SCA25)  
Likewise, in the studies of Just ice Neave and Lady Hale, it  is evident  that  in a num ber 
of cases the judge has produced a fem inist - inform ed leading judgment  and has 
carried the rest  of the court  with her (Hunter 2013, and e.g. Yem shaw v London 
Borough of Hounslow ,  above) .  
As well as engaging in collegial discussions of individual cases and inform al 
discussions out  of court ,  som e of the judges interviewed had been involved in form al 
j udicial educat ion program m es within their respect ive courts on issues of gender, 
culture, class and violence (e.g. FSC14) . A m agist rate explained:  
I  was on the Educat ional Com m it tee for a long t ime. The work we did on system ic 
bias I  think has m ade a difference (…) . We're m ore aware of what  m akes us t ick and 
what  we're thinking, and what  our  assum pt ions are. I  did a lot  of work with syllogism s 
for the m agist rates, and they'd never  heard of syllogism s (…) . We've addressed 
issues of gender. We've addressed issues of race, m igrant  groups and so on (…) . 
Aboriginalit y obviously has been a very big thing. Assessm ent  of witnesses. 
Understanding what  it  is you're being told and what  you're not  being told but  which 
you should be aware of,  dem eanour and what  you can judge from  that  and what  you 
can't  j udge from  that . A lot  of work's been done there. (SLC31)  
Another m agist rate described a com m unity educat ion program m e run by her court  
which was also useful for j udicial officers:  
We run a ‘walk in her  shoes’ tour of how you – the process of applying for [ a dom est ic 
violence injunct ion] . I  actually (…)  I  went  and did that  and it ’s terrifying (…) . Our 
applicant  support  worker (…)  takes people through what ’s involved and I ’m  usually 
at  the end of the tour and I  give a chat  about  what  happens when people get  into 
court . So it ’s for anyone, whether it ’s social workers, m agist rates – and I  actually run 
them  for m agist rates as well, because it ’s really useful for us to see what  happens 
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outside the court room . So I  recognise it ’s an ext rem ely int im idat ing process, actually 
get t ing into court . (SLC20) 
The m ult iple points at  which a fem inist  perspect ive could be brought  to bear in a case 
was well sum m arised by an interviewee who welcom ed the opportunit ies so provided:  
I ’m  very pleased to be sit t ing in a posit ion now where I  can m ake sure that  the 
equalit y plays out  in the way the case is run, in the outcom e, in the opportunity to 
be heard, everything. (FIC13) 
5 . The w here  of fem inist  judging 
The legal issues and areas of law ident ified by interviewees and seen in the case 
studies as sites for the int roduct ion of fem inist  perspect ives were of course, as noted 
earlier, significant ly related to the profile of those studied and interviewed, alm ost  all 
of whom  sat  on generalist  or fam ily courts and handled largely run of the m ill cr im inal, 
civil and fam ily m at ters. I t  is not  surprising, then, that  the m ajor subject -m at ters to 
em erge were those in which wom en as lit igants were prom inent ly represented before 
those courts.  Dom est ic violence was an issue that  arose in crim inal law, fam ily law 
and in the m aking of civil injunct ions, and so unsurprisingly was raised m ost  often 
by interviewees and in the case studies (see also Douglas 2016) .  Sentencing was 
another prom inent  issue, since it  appears at  all levels of state court  hierarchies – 
sum m ary crim e, interm ediate and superior t r ial courts, and on appeal – and involves 
wom en as vict im s as well as defendants. Sim ilarly, wom en appeared frequent ly in 
cases and interviews as vict im s of sexual offences (see also Douglas 2016) . On the 
civil side, the m ost  frequent ly cited areas where wom en appeared as lit igants were 
in fam ily law and personal injuries. 
Areas appearing in the case studies or m ent ioned by interviewees less frequent ly 
included child sexual abuse, discrim inat ion and sexual harassm ent , breaches of 
privacy, crim es com pensat ion, m ental health law, em ploym ent  and indust rial 
relat ions law, im migrat ion and refugee determ inat ions and administ rat ive law. I f we 
had interviewed m ore m em bers of specialist  t r ibunals, som e of these areas would no 
doubt  have assum ed greater prom inence as again they are areas in which wom en 
frequent ly appear as lit igants. Prelim inary results from  our study of Lady Hale’s 
decisions on the UK Suprem e Court  would add educat ion, housing, social welfare and 
m edical law to this list . 
None of this m eans – as the FJPs dem onst rate – that  there is no scope for a fem inist  
approach to areas such as const itut ional law (see, e.g., Wom en’s Court  of Canada 
2006, Rubenstein 2014, Stanchi et  al. 2016a, Yarwood and Pir ini 2017) , tax (see, 
e.g., Buckley 2006, Sadiq 2014)  or com m ercial law (see, e.g.,  Auchm uty 2010, 
Mulcahy and Andrews 2010, Stace 2017) . But  t hese possibilit ies arise perhaps less 
rout inely and for fewer j udges than m ight  be the case for  the areas ident ified.  
6 . Const ra ints and lim itat ions 
As well as observing the wide range of possibilit ies for fem inist  judging out lined 
above, the case studies and interviews ident ified real lim itat ions and const raints on 
such a role. I n short , there was not  always room  for a fem inist  perspect ive, and even 
when there was, the fem inist  j udge could not  always reach the result  she m ight  have 
wanted. 
I  have elsewhere discussed the fact  that  fem inist  j udging is dependent  upon, am ong 
other things, whether the subject  m at ter of the case provides any opportunity for a 
fem inist  approach (Hunter 2015a, pp. 133-140) .  I n m y study of Just ice Neave I  found 
that  only around one third of the cases on which she sat  raised any kind of a fem inist  
or gender issue (Hunter 2013, p. 405) . I n our study of Lady Hale, the proport ion 
appears to be even lower, at  under one quarter of cases, including cases where the 
topic (such as race discrim inat ion or the status of a part icular group of workers as 
em ployees or independent  cont ractors)  does not  involve wom en or gender issues but  
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the outcom e m ight  have im plicat ions for  wom en. Several of the judicial officers 
interviewed, in State lower, interm ediate and superior courts, considered that  the 
areas of law they dealt  with rarely raised gender issues, were not  very conducive to 
a fem inist  approach, or  did not  provide m uch scope to prom ote wom en’s r ights, 
part icularly in civil m at ters (SLC17, SIC36, SSC38) . The list  of subject -m at ters 
ident ified above bears out  this observat ion. 
I n t erm s of const raints on reaching the desired outcom e, a num ber of interviewees 
on t r ibunals and interm ediate court s sim ply said they were const rained by the law, 
legislat ion or legal categories. One said she was “not  infrequent ly”  com pelled to reach 
decisions that  were in accordance with the law but  not  with her fem inism  (FIC35;  
also SIC37) . Two federal t ribunal m em bers noted that  som et im es it  was clear that  a 
wom an applicant  had been t reated badly, but  her situat ion did not  fit  within the 
rem edial scope of the relevant  legislat ion (FT21, FT40) . A State superior  court  j udge 
com plained part icularly about  crim inal law:  
A lot  of the stuff that  I  have done m y whole life is to do with cr im e. I t 's not  the only 
area but  it 's certainly an area where there is a long-established (…)  I  don't  know if 
you would call it  m isogyny or if you'd just  call it  stupidit y, but  a long-established view 
of wom en that  doesn't  reflect  either m y experience or anything that  you could 
possibly describe as fem inist , and to the extent  that  that  law is binding on m e then 
it  is difficult  (…) . I  think t here are cases in which if I  had an absolutely free hand I  
would have decided them  different ly. (SSC39)  
The const raint  of gender biased precedents was discussed above, and was m ent ioned 
by another t r ial j udge in the context  of j ury inst ruct ions:  
in a t r ial you've got  very lit t le abilit y or power to do anything about  [ how the j ury will 
decide] . So all you can do is ensure that  your direct ions – well first  of all they've got  
to com ply with the law, you've got  to put  it  all in. We know that  the direct ions we 
have to give jur ies in rape cases are so prescribed, and so caut ious, in other words 
they provide m any, m any protect ions for the accused person – as they should – so 
m any protect ions for the accused person it 's very hard to get  a convict ion. I  haven't  
had a convict ion in a rape case for ages. (SIC24)  
Another const raint  m ent ioned was m andatory sentencing legislat ion, which fet tered 
judges’ discret ion to take people’s individual circum stances into account  and could 
thus produce results felt  to be very unfair (SLC17) . At  appellate level, although 
unhelpful precedents were not  such an issue, t he court  m ight  have lim ited power to 
produce a just  result  where an appeal concerned findings of fact  or the exercise of 
discret ion by the t r ial judge. Although the appellate judge m ight  them selves have 
decided the case different ly, there m ay be no point  of law on which to allow the 
appeal (FSC27) . 
Only two interviewees explicit ly art iculated judicial ideology – norm s about  what  it  is 
and is not  perm issible for j udges to do – as opposed to laws and precedents with 
which they disagreed, as a const raint  on fem inist  decision-m aking. One of these 
instances has been discussed above, where the judge adopted a pract ice of 
apologising to applicants in crim es com pensat ion cases, which was considered 
“hugely cont roversial” . This sam e judge was generally prepared to push the envelope’ 
as far as it  would go, and som et im es further, and so had som ething of an antagonist ic 
relat ionship with the legal establishm ent . The other was m ore accept ing of j udicial 
culture, which in her view exerted definite lim its on fem inist  possibilit ies:  
I 'm  not  sure whether there are cases that  you can think of where, perhaps, a fem inist  
pr inciple could have been applied? 
Look, if it  could be applied legit im ately I  would have applied it , yes, always, always;  
but  it 's about  whether it 's legit im ate to do so without  extending out  beyond 
perm issible barriers. (SSC32) 
I t  is notable that  these two judges were am ong the ‘first  wom en’ appointed to 
Aust ralian courts. I t  is possible that  their pioneering work as fem inist  j udges m ay 
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have effected som e shifts in j udicial ideology, m eaning that  their successors have not  
had to face all of the sam e barriers as they did. 
A final const raint  m ent ioned by two interviewees, and which undoubtedly cont inues 
to operate, is the need for  argum ents put  to the court  t o be inform ed by a fem inist  
perspect ive, rather than expect ing fem inist  j udges to do all the work on their own. 
One judge m ade this point  in relat ion to the failure of lawyers to seek spousal 
m aintenance for wom en in divorce cases:  
[ A] t  som e point  along the t rack in fam ily law it  becam e very fashionable to think 
about  the break in the relat ionship theory where you go to court , you sort  out  the 
kids, you get  your property and I  get  m y property and we go our separate ways. The 
clean break. A casualty of the clean break theory really was m aintenance for wom en 
(…) . There was a sort  of not ion that  we'll give you a lit t le bit  more now, you'll get  60, 
I ' ll get  40, and that 's an end of it , you're on your own now. Now I  keep m y earning 
capacity and I  am  (…)  a barr ister or a doctor or an architect  or a pilot  or a business 
and an earning capacity is about  the m ost  valuable thing you can take out  of a 
m arr iage (…) . And in a couple of years’ t im e I 'm  in a house again and I 'm  skiing again 
and I 've got  another Porsche and I 'm  on m y way, okay. She is looking after the kids, 
scrounging for a part  t im e job, because she hasn't  worked – in paid work – for 
perhaps 20 years, very hard (…) . [ S] o there was this clean break thing and 
theoret ically it  was included in this idea that  you're get t ing a bit  m ore. But  the bit  
m ore got  double counted all the t im e because a bit  m ore was because you had the 
m ajor responsibilit y for the kids, and a bit  more was because you didn't  earn as m uch 
and a bit  m ore was that  you really weren't  going to be able to keep paying the rates 
on the house (…) . [ A] nd you would say to people when they brought  in applicat ions, 
‘why aren't  you seeking m aintenance for this wom an in addit ion to the property?  
Alr ight , she's get t ing her share of the property, she's housing the kids, but  she 
doesn't  have the capacity to support  herself, and your client  – the other [ party]  has 
the capacity to cont ribute to her support ’. And it  would be ‘ah, it 's all a clean break’.  
You could write about  it  ‘t il you were blue in the face, you could encourage (…)  (…) . 
Judges could consider it , but  the judges couldn't  m ake the case. And you could write 
in a judgm ent  about  them  not  m aking the case. You could t ry and persuade them  to 
m ake the case. But  part icular ly in a court  (…)  if you're running a t r ial, that 's the end 
of a 12 m onth or 13, 14 m onth case m anagem ent  pathway. You can't  suddenly in 
the m iddle of the t r ial say ‘hey you, why don't  you ask for som e m aintenance?’ 
(FSC14)  
And a m agist rate m ade a plea for fem inist  advocacy:  
[ T] here's lots of very energet ic young fem inist  women who part icular ly com e on to 
the [ m agist rates court ]  and, with som e dism ay I  im agine, are confronted with the 
inabilit y to t ranslate that  fem inism  into a fem inist  output . So yes, I 've had som e 
discussions, I  go back and talk to the com m unity legal cent res and say ‘I  can't  be a 
fem inist  j udge unless there are fem inist  advocates in front  of m e. I f it 's not  argued I  
can't  choose it  as a result . So it 's a lit t le – it 's a bit  of a shock when you arr ive because 
you think oh, I 'm  an agent  for change (…) . I t 's a real shock. I  rem em ber this quite 
dist inct ly, that  if it 's not  argued you can't  pluck it  out  of the air . So yes, it 's far  m ore 
im portant  that  I  have fem inist  advocates, m ale and fem ale, who then enable m e as 
a fem inist  j udge. But  yes, unless it 's argued you can't  have it . I f you've got  two 
part ies in front  of you who aren't  arguing it  you're left  high and dry. You can sort  of 
suggest  – you know, have we thought  about  blah? Do you want  to address m e about  
that? But  yes, that 's kind of – one of the key things I  wanted to get  across in this is 
that  if there aren't  fem inist  advocates, being a fem inist  j udge is a waste of t im e. 
(SLC30)  
Of course, this was an overstatem ent  to m ake the point , and she then gave exam ples 
of being a fem inist  j udge without  the help of fem inist  advocacy. But  the point  is an 
im portant  one, nonetheless, especially as a const raint  not  experienced within FJPs.  
7 . Conclusions 
How, then, do the im agined judgm ents of the FJPs com pare with the ‘real world’ 
fem inist  j udgm ents discussed in this art icle? The FJPs have shown com prehensively 
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how fem inist  theories can be t ranslated into pract ice in the form  of legally plausible 
j udgm ents, and have dem onst rated powerfully that  even at  the sam e t im e, against  
the sam e background, with the law as it  then stood and the fact s as they were known 
to the court , original decisions were not  inevitable and cases could have been decided 
different ly. Many of the fem inist  rewrites change the result  of the case, but  in others, 
the result  rem ains the sam e but  the reasoning is different . That  reasoning m ight  
involve at tent ion to previously excluded experience, reference to im portant  social 
context , the avoidance or reject ion of gendered assum pt ions and stereotypes, and 
incorporat ion of fem inist  knowledge. Where the fem inist  j udge reaches a different  
outcom e from  the original decision, it  m ay be a result  of reinterpretat ion of 
const itut ional texts or legislat ion, developm ent  of the com m on law, or a different  
applicat ion of the law to the facts. I n part icular, the telling of the story and 
const ruct ion of the fact s have often proved to be st rategically im portant , both in 
achieving the legal recognit ion of the realit y and specificit y of wom en’s lives, and in 
laying the foundat ion for a different  legal analysis. At  the sam e t im e, t he rewrit ten 
judgm ents have m ade it  clear that  there is also scope for different  fem inist  
approaches to som e cases – fem inism  is not  m onolithic and som e fem inists m ight  
disagree with the reasoning adopted by the fem inist  j udge in quest ion. As self-
conscious projects,  the FJPs lend them selves m ore easily to scrut iny and analysis 
than do ‘real world’ instances of fem inist  j udging ( for accounts of the FJPs published 
to date, see Majury 2006, Hunter et  al.  2010, 2017, Davies 2012, Hunter 2012, 
2015b, Rackley 2012, Douglas et  al.  2014b, Stanchi et  al.  2016b, McCandless et  al.  
2017, Enright  2017, Shine Thom pson 2017) .  
As indicated above, the FJPs cover a wider range of subject -m at ters t han the ‘real 
world’ exam ples given by interviewees, and they also reflect  the different  
j urisdict ional st ructures and nat ional contexts within which they have been produced. 
The Canadian proj ect  focused solely and the US project  substant ially on key aspects 
of const itut ional law (Wom en’s Court  of Canada 2006, Stanchi et  al.  2016a) . The 
Northern/ I r ish project  was concerned with the gendered legal const ruct ion of nat ional 
ident it y, and consequent ly it s rewrit ten decisions cluster around issues of 
reproduct ion, m otherhood, fam ilies, and cit izenship (Enright  et  al.  2017) . And the 
Aotearoa New Zealand project  includes a num ber of j udgm ents rewrit ten from  a 
m ana wahine perspect ive which puts Maori wom en at  the cent re (McDonald et  al.  
2017) . Both ‘real world’ fem inist  j udges – as the above exam ples and quotat ions 
show – and the FJPs include m en and children as well as wom en ( in all their variety)  
within their purview, however the range of vulnerable subjects in FJP judgm ents 
extends to include businesses (Mulcahy and Andrews 2010) , anim als and m arine life 
(Fox 2017, Wheen 2017) , the land (Johnston and Hori Te Pa 2017)  and the 
environm ent  (Godden 2014, van Wagner 2017) . 
I n addit ion, the FJPs are m ore consciously inform ed by fem inist  legal theory. While 
som e of the ‘real life’ j udges interviewed are or had been readers of fem inist  legal 
literature, the great  m ajorit y of interviewees said they knew lit t le or nothing of 
fem inist  theory, had gone to law school before wom en and the law or fem inist  
j urisprudence courses becam e available, and had gained their fem inist  knowledge 
from  act ivist  involvem ent  in the fem inist  m ovem ent  and/ or from  their experience in 
pract ice as lawyers and judges. Consequent ly, part icipants in the FJPs are likely to 
have been m ore reflect ive about  their fem inism  and m ore conscious of the fem inist  
choices being m ade in their decisions, especially where they took part  in workshops 
to discuss draft  j udgm ents organised as part  of m any of the FJPs. By cont rast , 
fem inist  j udges in the ‘real world’ are not  usually exposed to a range of fem inist  views 
or com pelled to think about  differing fem inist  approaches to a part icular issue. 
Furtherm ore, while the FJPs have largely engaged with appellate decision-m aking 
and included only a relat ively sm all num ber of first  instance and lower court  decisions, 
the profile of interviewees, as noted earlier, was quite different . The m ajorit y of the 
lat ter were first  instance decision-m akers sit t ing on interm ediate or lower courts and 
t r ibunals. As a result , there were several const raints on the ‘real world’ j udges 
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interviewed which the fict ional j udges in the FJPs have not  faced. The fict ional j udges 
have not  had to operate in areas of law where there is no scope for a fem inist  
perspect ive, and have not  had to contend with gender biased precedents. I ndeed, 
often the aim  of writ ing fem inist  j udgm ents is t o change such precedents!  Even by 
cont rast  with ‘real wor ld’ appellate judges, FJP judgm ent -writers have not  been 
reliant  on fem inist  argum ents being put  to them , although in som e cases judgm ent -
writers have queried why part icular lines of argum ent  were not  put  to the court  ( e.g. 
Carr  and Hunter 2010, p. 327, Rathus and Alexander 2014, p. 388) . Judgm ent -
writers in the FJPs have also, perhaps, been less caut ious about  int roducing ext r insic 
evidence in the form  of internat ional convent ions, nat ional stat ist ics, research reports 
and academ ic literature into their j udgm ents, freed from  the const raint  experienced 
by ‘real world’ j udges of having to put  m aterial to both sides for  com m ent  before 
being able to rely on it  ( see, e.g. Hunter 2010, pp. 37-40, Douglas et  al.  2014b, 
pp.23-27) . However pract ice in this regard varies between jurisdict ions, and ‘real 
world’ j udges m ay also resort  t o the expedient  of assert ing their background 
understanding as “com m on knowledge”  which avoids the need to cite their part icular 
sources (see Hunter 2013, pp. 406-407) . 
On the other hand, the ‘real’ fem inist  judges brought  their fem inist  sensibilit ies to all 
aspects of the judicial role, including m anaging their court room s, working with j uries, 
fact - finding, and interact ing with other j udges, as well as writ ing judgm ents. These 
are aspects of j udging which have not  entered into the FJPs, but  are im portant  to 
rem em ber, since they probably consum e the m ajorit y of all j udicial t ime. The ‘real 
world’ exam ples also had a greater em phasis on sentencing, and on tort  law and the 
assessm ent  of dam ages as the m ajor area of civil law dealt  with by generalist  courts 
in which gender issues arise. Fem inist  j udgm ents on tort  law and sentencing decisions 
have been included in the Aust ralian (Burns 2014, van Riswij k and Townley 2014) , 
Northern/ I r ish (O’Rourke 2017, Conaghan 2017, McCandless 2017)  and Aotearoa 
New Zealand FJPs (Stace 2017, Toki 2017) , but  have not  assum ed the prom inence 
they m ay have in realit y. 
Otherwise, however, there appears to be a substant ial degree of confluence between 
im agined and ‘real world’ fem inist  j udging, certainly in term s of ‘how’ it  is done – it s 
epistem ologies, values and pract ices. Perhaps, then, fem inist  j udging m ay be m ore 
of a shared enterprise than those of us involved in FJPs m ight  have im agined, and 
there are m any ‘real wor ld’ fem inist  j udges who have been there before us. Why does 
this com e as a surprise? Part ly it  is a product  of our academ ic focus on appellate 
decision-m aking or,  to put  it  another way, our academ ic blindness to the bulk of the 
judicial iceberg:  the procedural aspects of j udging and the unreported decisions m ade 
day after day in the courts and t r ibunals m ost  people encounter.  
But  it  m ay also be at  least  part ly due to another significant  const raint  on fem inist  
j udging in the ‘real world’, which is the abilit y to speak about  it . Many fem inist  judges 
report  that  they are wary of ident ifying as fem inists in public (as opposed to in a 
confident ial interview)  or even suggest ing that  gender m ight  be relevant  to j udging, 
because they will be seen to be “ let t ing the side down”  (Hunter 2008, p. 16)  or 
“ replacing one bias with another”  (SSC2) . I  have dealt  with the accusat ion of bias 
elsewhere (Hunter 2008, pp. 15-27, 2010, pp. 30-35) , but  of course, as am ply 
dem onst rated in this art icle, the object ive of fem inist  j udging is not  to privilege 
wom en but  t o correct  historical exclusions so that  everyone is t reated fair ly. A key 
elem ent  of j udicial ideology, however, is t o m aintain the fict ion that  the law, and 
judges, are (already)  fair, neut ral and object ive. For a judge – as opposed to an 
academ ic crit ic – to suggest  otherwise is indeed “ let t ing the side down” . I n light  of 
this ideology, perhaps we have paid too m uch at tent ion to what  ‘real world’ fem inist  
j udges (don’t )  say than to what  they (quiet ly but  effect ively)  do.  
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